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Following the events of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush began 
implementing a new National Security Policy that stressed the importance of 
strengthening alliances world wide and defeating global terror networks while at the same 
time opening up societies and building the proper infrastructures for the development of 
democracy on a global scale.1  As part of this new policy, the United States began 
increasing its military and political efforts in states that had recently been the breeding 
grounds for terrorist networks and organizations.  Military actions in Afghanistan in 2001 
and 2002, allowed for the first time, since the beginning of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), for these policies to be implemented.   
Afghanistan, the war-torn state and ethnically fragmented society, became a test 
bed of this new democratization policy.  A tyrannical and fundamentalist regime was 
driven from power and a new government was established under the guidance of the 
United States and international organizations like the United Nations.  The hopes of the 
Bush Administration and the United Nations were that the new democratic government 
would succeed, would conduct friendly foreign policies towards the United States and the 
remainder of the global community, and would no longer be a safe heaven for terrorist 
organizations.  Also, Afghanistan could become an example to other states that face the 
same challenges in the region as well as the Middle East – regions that are acutely diverse 
both ethnically and religiously, which can lead to fragmented societies.  
Today, Afghanistan faces a daunting challenge.  The challenge of creating a 
government based on democratic ideals that will have a strong cohesive administrative 
capability from the rubbles of a nation that has faced conflict and civil war over the last 
three decades.  Complicating this effort is the simple fact that Afghanistan does not have 
a well established democratic past nor does its people have a memory of a successful and 
nationally cohesive central government.  Most former Afghan regimes ruled from Kabul 
by using their own tribal affiliations, Islamic rhetoric, and a strong hand, in the form of a 
secret police and loyal military; a military that has been predominantly of one ethnic 
                                                 
1 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House, 
2002), 1-2. 
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background.  All of these regimes shared a common trait, however, which was the failure 
to create a true national state/government and associated infrastructure.  They failed 
because they instituted and enforced policies and reforms that were counter to the 
populace’s religious, ethnic and tribal beliefs, which eventually brought them into direct 
conflict with their constituents and Afghan society as a whole.  
The greatest challenge facing the current Afghan government is the task of 
overcoming Afghan society’s deep tribal and clan-based distrust of a central authority, 
and the historical differences among the ethnic groups that have been the source of 
instability and conflict for hundreds of years.  For example, since the creation of the 
modern state of Afghanistan, the Pashtun tribal confederation has ruled the nation.  This 
phenomenon has led to deep rooted anti-Pashtun feelings in many different regions of the 
country and among the non-Pashtun ethnic groups.  In addition, this dynamic has even 
created conflict among the different Pashtun tribes and clans that have had no access to 
the reins of power within the state and have been sidelined by their own Pashtun cousins.  
The creation of a truly democratic state could, theoretically, allow other ethnic groups, 
including the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, to form coalitions in order to gain political 
power and introduce a new governing dynamic within Afghan society.  It is highly 
unlikely the Pashtuns would allow themselves to be ruled by a non-Pashtun for an 
extended period of time.  This has rarely occurred in history and when it has, it directly 
led to bloody revolt and conflict.  This potential of a non-Pashtun head of state could, in 
turn, further fragment the already fragile society.  This may lead to an internal power 
struggle which could further incite ethnic fighting.   
This demonstrates the difficulty of overcoming ethnic differences and the sheer 
nature of Afghan politics that have, for hundreds of years, been politicized through an 
ethnic and religious means.  There is now a great burden on the shoulders of 
Afghanistan’s Pashtun President Hamid Karzai who has to balance his own allegiance to 
his tribe and ethnicity against the need to create and promote an Afghan national identity 
which will allow Afghans to overlook ethnic differences and feel free to identify with the 
nation as whole.  This endeavor alone will determine Afghanistan’s success or failure in 




This thesis will examine how Afghanistan as an ethnically fragmented society has 
attempted state formation.  It will try to answer the question of whether or not a society 
that is as ethnically, religiously and culturally fragmented as is Afghanistan can succeed 
in forming a cohesive government and create the conditions for democratic development.  
Current theory on nationalism and state formation stresses the difficulty of forming a 
democratic, let alone cohesive government, when there is more than one ethnic group 
within any given state or society.  There are numerous examples today of the challenges 
of this phenomenon in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans.  Afghanistan’s lack of established 
democratic institutions and a basic democratic culture helps lessen the chances of 
forming and maintaining a democracy, let alone a functioning central government that is 
considered legitimate among the general population.  Finally, this thesis will examine the 
impact of a failed or successful Afghan state on the region and the United States in the 
near term. 
B. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
The last one hundred years of Afghan history has been filled with many different 
experiences in government.  Rarely has power peacefully transitioned from regime to 
another.  Moreover, the collapse of many of these regimes was ultimately caused by their 
interactions, on all levels, with Afghan society.  A direct conflict occurred when the 
central government forced its laws to supersede tribal-ethnic codes/laws that have always 
been deeply rooted within every Afghan’s life.  For the rural villager of Afghanistan, 
these new laws usually were perceived as attempts by the central government to extend 
its power in areas and in levels of society that they were not comfortable in allowing.  
Affinity, loyalty, and honor for Afghans (especially the Pashtuns), lies within the village, 
the village leaders/elders, religious leaders, the ethnic group, or in some cases, the rich 
landowning notables, known as the khans.  The main argument of this thesis will be that 
it will be extremely difficult for the newly-formed government to establish or gain 
pervasive political control over Afghanistan, whose people still base their loyalties on 
traditional, ethnic and tribal values and hierarchies.  Furthermore, it is extremely difficult 
to persuade the Afghans to relinquish control over their lives and livelihoods to the 
central government’s authority.  For the current government to succeed, implementation 
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of national programs and measures to solidify control needs to occur over a long period 
of time; meaning over generations and decades.  The current government will only be 
able to lay down the foundation that future governments will have to build upon, 
however, the longer the process takes, the greater the chance for the creation of other 
dominant political forces, both on the local and national level.  These new forces can 
pose a direct challenge, as it has happened in the past, to the central government and 
produce an alternate authority within the state causing the Afghan population, in simple 
terms, to choose a side based on the amount of impact either power center would have on 
their day to day lives. 
The examples that will be used in this thesis will be case studies involving past 
Afghan regimes starting from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present.  Case 
studies will allow for a broad analysis to be conducted of the interactions of Afghans with 
their government; with the addition of studying this interaction with four distinct 
governing methods (i.e. monarchy vs. parliamentary).  Furthermore, this thesis will 
analyze the failures of each case study and compare them to the current Afghan 
government.  Policies on economics, social issues, and laws will be examined and 
compared for each regime studied.  This will allow for an accurate measure to test the 
effectiveness and acceptance of the current policies and will help to determine whether or 
not the current government has a chance for success in relationship to the experiences of 
the past.  The regimes that have been chosen for comparison are diverse in nature and are 
examples of different forms of governing, starting with a traditional monarchy, then a 
constitutional monarchy, followed by a parliamentary system and finally ending with an 
attempt at a socialist form of government.  Using these different systems allows for a 
comparison of a wide range of governing methods and helps further the theory that no 
form of government can easily overcome ethnic fragmentation and ethnic distrust within 
a nation-state.   
C. RELEVANCE OF TOPIC 
The success of a democratic and cohesive Afghan government, one that is able to 
foster a strong sense of nationalism over ethnic and tribal identity, is of high importance 
to the United States as it aggressively promotes the creation of democracy in other 
regions of the Middle East and Southwest Asia.  If the current Afghan regime can 
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succeed, with American support, it will be the first time a truly democratic government 
will be able to govern the Afghan people and will help form the basic foundation for 
Afghan nationalism.  The Afghan model of democracy, adapted per individual scenario, 
could be a good example for other states in the region and might form the basic model for 
American foreign policy pursuits.   
D. THESIS CONTENTS BY CHAPTER 
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter introduced the purpose of this thesis and introduced the research 
question.  It also attempted to present the reader with a basic prognosis for whether or not 
the current government of Afghanistan can achieve success.  This idea being based off of 
the lessons learned from previous attempts in government formation and the creation of a 
national identity.   
2. Chapter II: Research Design, Theory and Propositions 
Chapter II will introduce the research design and methodology of this thesis in 
conjunction with discussion of the general theory and the expected results of the research.  
In addition, the thesis propositions will be discussed and a conceptual model for state 
formation and the impact of ethnic fragmentation on Afghanistan will be presented.   
3. Chapter III: Literature Review 
This chapter will review the current literature on state formation, national identity 
and democratic development.  In addition, the literature review will introduce 
propositions that will be studied within this thesis and will present current discussion on 
each proposition as it relates to Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the specific influences of 
ethnicity and national identity in regards to Afghan state formation will be analyzed.   
4. Chapter IV: Case Studies 
Chapter IV will introduce the case studies for this thesis and analyze them in 
regards to the propositions that will be defined in Chapter III.  It will explore how 
reforms and policies carried out by these regimes countered traditional ethnic and tribal 
norms and how this process led to their collapse or to a violent transition to another 
regime.  The four regimes that will be analyzed include those of Amir Habibullah Khan, 
Amanullah Khan, Zahir Shah and Daoud Shah.  Picked because of their different 
approaches to governing and state formation, these regimes will be compared to the 
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current Afghan government lead by Hamid Karzai.  The diversity of the regimes, from 
monarchies to constitutional monarchies, to parliamentary to socialist/communist, will 
allow for the analysis of a broad spectrum of approaches to state formation in 
Afghanistan and will provide a lesson learned for the current and future regimes. 
5. Chapter V: Conclusion 
The final chapter will summarize the findings of this thesis and will assess the 
possibilities of success in Afghanistan in the creation of a democratic and cohesive state 
that will be able to last generations, weighing heavily on past experiences as well as the 
current processes in state formation.  In addition, this chapter will analyze the impact of 
the success or failure of Afghanistan to create a stable and democratic state on the region 




II. RESEARCH DESIGN, THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is designed to study four past Afghan regimes and determine the way 
in which each tried to maintain central authority and compare those processes to the one 
occurring today.  For this purpose specifically, four former regimes were selected that 
represent different types of governing methods by which Afghanistan has been ruled. 
These forms of government range from a monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, 
followed by a parliamentary system and ending with a socialist experiment in the mid to 
late 1970s.   
 The first regime analyzed is that of Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-1919), who 
gained power after the death of his father and continued ruling Afghanistan as a monarch 
with a strong connection to the religious establishment within the state.  Amir Habibullah 
was followed by Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) the second regime of thesis focus, who 
tried to implement a new constitutional system and broad range of social and economic 
reforms that would eventually be rejected by the Afghan population.  The third regime, 
King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) was able to rule Afghanistan for nearly forty years but in 
trying to implement a parliamentary system within a monarchy, failed to allow for 
increased participation on the part of the Afghan people and ultimately failed to bring 
about social change within the overall society.  Finally, Daoud Khan (1973-1978) took 
power in a coup and tried to drastically change the Afghan social mores by enacting 
socialist based ideals, which left little room for religion and traditionalism within the 
Afghan state, eventually bringing about direct external intervention into Afghanistan, 
spurring a long and bloody civil war.  These four regimes and their successes and failures 
will be highlighted in reference to the current government of Afghanistan, to create a 
basic litmus test to determine the possible reactions that it might face in it attempt to 
promote democratic development. 
B. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
For this thesis, a basic conceptual model of state formation was formulated in 
order to hypothesize on the impacts of different societal forces upon state formation and 
democratic development.  This conceptual model is graphically depicted in Figure 1: 
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Conceptual Model for State Formation.  The model postulates the positive and negative 
influences that different elements within government and society have on the overall 
democratic process in Afghanistan and how each is related.  As seen in the figure, ethnic 
fragmentation is hypothesized as having the greatest negative influence on the creation of 
a national identity, which in turn impacts not only on the state itself, but also on 
democratic development.  In addition, ethnic fragmentation is hypothesized to have a 
negative impact on the central authority’s legitimacy, especially if one ethnic group 
becomes the majority or dominate group within the state.  Central authority is assumed 
required to create the state and democratic development, and must be considered 
legitimate in order to carry out the required steps for democratic development.   
 
 






C. THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS 
Propositions derived from the conceptual model presented above will be assessed 
in the following chapter via a literature review of state formation and democratic 
development. Special attention will be focused on literature that examines the impact that 
an ethnically fragmented society may have on this process.  By analyzing these 
propositions, it may be possible to determine the chances for success or failure of a state 
in fostering the proper conditions for the development of specific democratic 
infrastructures while facing the delicate issues of ethnic fragmentation and absence of 
national identity.  In addition, current literature on this topic will help introduce the sheer 
difficulty any state faces in accomplishing its goal of democratic development while 
facing deep ethnic cleavages within society, combined with religious and tribal 
differences.  
Figure 2: Propositions, presents two broad theories, the first being that a basic 
national identity is critical for democratic development. (P1)2  In addition, central 
government authority and popular support of the government are critical for democratic 
development. (P2)  Each proposition is disaggregated into sub-propositions.  The first 
proposition has two sub-propositions which include the propositions that ethnic 
fragmentation and conflict hinders the development of a national identity (P1.1) and 
ethnic fragmentation within Afghanistan hinders the development of an Afghan national 
identity. (P1.2)  The second proposition has an additional sub-proposition which states 
that ethnic fragmentation, tribalism and religion can challenge central government 
authority and legitimacy. (P2.1) 
                                                 
2 During the reading of the analysis of each individual case study in Chapter IV, the reader will notice 
that periodically, at the end of a sentence or a section, there will be an annotation, such as (P1), (P2), 
(P2.1), etc…  This is meant to signify the relevance of that sentence or section in regards to the 
corresponding proposition in Figure 2: Propositions.  Figure 2: Propositions will be re-displayed at the 
beginning of Chapter Four for the reader’s convenience.   
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The process of creating a nation-state has been an undertaking, that over the 
course of history, has brought with it both success and failure.  There are many key 
factors that can contribute to either outcome. Overtime, these factors can help predict the 
degree in which any society can coalesce under one national identity.  The creation of a 
system of government that is democratic, or allows for the greatest number of participants 
from all levels of society in the governing process, has posed a great challenge to many 
nations that have attempted this process.  Compounding this challenge has been the issue 






unity under a system of government that allows majority rule while protecting minority 
rights.  Simply put, Horowitz writes that “the major failure of democracy is ethnic 































                                                 
3 Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ethnic identity has been a driving force in human interaction for thousands of 
years.  It helps form a common bond among humans and builds boundaries for 
interactions between separate groups and individuals.  One’s culture and ethnicity can 
become a dominate factor in one’s approach to state formation and ideas of governing.  In 
tribal societies, ethnicity plays even a greater role in the everyday lives of individuals and 
their interactions with others from different ethnic and tribal groups.  Afghanistan is a 
prime example of a society with ethnic cleavages that help form an immense obstacle to 
the creation of a democratically cohesive government that is seen as legitimate in its rule 
over the masses.   
There are many theories that try to explain the impact of ethnic identity and 
ethnicity on the development of nation-states and democratic institutions.  According to 
Diamond and Plattner, “ethnicity is the most difficult type of cleavage for democracy to 
manage.”4  This proposition has shown its relevance in the experiences of states 
throughout Africa and Asia in the last hundred years.  Tribal and ethnic loyalties were, 
and are still today, placed before loyalties to governments that rule from far away 
capitals.  The underlying failure of many of these states has been the non-inclusion of all 
minority groups in the rule of government and the government’s willingness to favor one 
ethnic group over another.5  These ethnically charged relationships can lead to conflict 





                                                 
4 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), XVII. 
5 Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994), 48. 
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Today, as seen in Figure 3: Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan, a major 
problem for Afghanistan is the fact that it “is marked by an enormous heterogeneity of 
population in terms of ethno-linguistic and religious affiliation and socio-political 
organization.”6   
 
Figure 3.   Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan 
(From: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/terrorism/maps_ethnolinguistic.htm) 
[Accessed February 28, 2006] 
 
Figure 3 suggests to enormity of ethnic diversity within Afghanistan and the sheer scope 
of the challenge faced by the current government in attempting to foster a national 
identity.  The reality is that Afghans associate themselves with several kinds of social 
                                                 
6 Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, “The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism, and their 
Discontents,” in Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World. The Struggle for the Afghan State, 
eds. Willem Van Schendel and Erik J. Zurcher (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), 151. 
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groupings: with territorial groupings of varying scales, with kinship groupings, with 
Islamic sect affiliations (the Sufis), that are followers of holy men that are seen as “saints” 
or simply known as “pirs.”7  Forging a common identity by breaking the bonds of such 
social groupings has not been accomplished by any Afghan government of the last one 
hundred years -- ranging from monarchies to socialist based regimes.  This deeply rooted 
affinity to traditions, family, and social/political units have seemingly created the greatest 
barrier for the creation of an Afghan national identity and democracy.  
B. ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM, AND THE NATION-STATE 
According to Hastings, “nation, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion are four 
distinct and determinative elements within world history.”8  They are core concepts for 
every human and help guide individual and group motivations while determining how 
these entities will react to certain situations.  All four are closely linked to each other, and 
as Hastings argues, it is difficult to separate one from the others.9  To understand the 
interaction and importance of each of these terms on the overall creation of a national 
identity, they need to be further defined. 
A nation is usually formed from one or more different ethnic groups.  As defined 
by Smith, the nation is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members.”10  Gellner further defines nation as “the artifacts 
of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities; the fusion of will, culture and polity 
to the limits of its boundaries.”11  Nations are created from the human need to belong to a 
greater group that shares a common heritage and culture that can be identified by the  
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individual.  In short, a nation needs a shared common culture and recognition of 
individual rights and duties, as well as the virtue of the shared membership in that 
nation.12   
The term “nation” is sometimes substituted for the term “ethnicity,” but in most 
instances, they should not be used interchangeably.  The main difference between 
ethnicity and the nation, according to Smith, is the actual territoriality of nations; where 
as nations possess territories, ethnicity and ethnic groups do not generally correspond to a 
certain geographic area.13  Smith further defines ethnicity as a “community with a 
collective proper name, a myth of common culture, shared historical memories, one or 
more differentiating elements of common culture and an association with a specific 
(although not necessarily residence in) homeland.”14  A shared common language also is 
required, in addition to the above criteria, to create a more accurate definition of 
ethnicity.  All these factors help create familiarity among a group of individuals that, with 
the addition of a territory with a defined border, can form a nation-state.   
Nationalism is a strong feeling of unity among the ethnic groups that form a 
nation-state.  Hastings writes that “nationalism derives from the belief that one’s ethnic or 
national tradition is especially valuable and needs to be defended at almost any cost.”15  
In other words, citizens who are expected to fight and die for their country must come to 
consider themselves as part of one people or nation, even if they live vast distances from 
each other.16  This means that nationalism must overcome ethnic and religious 
differences to bond individuals solely on their identity as a nation.  If this common bond, 
or in other words, nationalism, cannot be created, the nation-state will be faced with the 
prospects of a fragmented society that is more susceptible to conflict internally.   
Finally, religion is an important factor that helps define the individual’s identity 
and in many cases, reflects directly on the individual’s ethnicity.  Throughout history, 
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religion has affected the creation of nation-states and in some cases, has even been the 
basis for forming a common bond between different ethnic groups and forging unity 
when no other force was capable of taking on such a task.  Religion has become the 
dominate character of some nation-states and of some nationalisms.17  This phenomenon 
can be seen throughout the Middle East where Islam has become directly associated to 
both ethnicity and nationalism and has helped form the state structures of regimes in the 
region. 
Ethnicity and nationalism are very important elements within any nation-state. 
They can be used to form a litmus test to help determine the chances for the creation of a 
stable and successful government.  When nationalism has difficulty taking a strong hold 
within a nation-state with more than one ethnic group, conditions for ethnic conflict are 
created.  Nationalism must supersede ethnic loyalties in order to avoid infighting between 
competing groups vying for political power.  Today’s successful nation-states have 
populations that have placed national identity before ethnic identity, while the failing 
states have still remained in an ever ethnically defined state structure, unable to forge 
unity and cohesiveness among the masses. 
C. PROPOSITION (1): A NATIONAL IDENTITY IS CRITCAL FOR 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 
As discussed in the previous section, the creation of a national identity is 
extremely important.  Not only does this create a sense of belonging and common 
identity among the population, but also creates conditions under which individuals are 
willing to act for the greater good of the nation as a whole, rather than for just a smaller 
segment of society.  By doing so, individuals become more accepting of democratic 
ideals and democratic development, which stresses the importance of catering to the 
common goals of the entire population.  Why have some states been able to successfully 
forge a national identity among its citizens while others have not?  According to Tilly, 
“the absence of extensive kinship or tribal organization favored the development of the 
nation-state in Western Europe.”18  Continuing on the same argument, Brinbaum and 
Badie argue that “Third World states generally face societies that maintain the persistence 
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of tribal or tribal structures, the crucial importance of kinship, and the limited 
individualization of property rights in land.”19  These ideas help demonstrate that strong 
ethnic identity is not conducive to allowing the growth and development of democratic 
institutions and a national identity that stresses the importance of the whole over that of 
the individual or the group.  In short, “the tribe or ethnic group gives primary importance 
to ties of kinship and patrilineal descent, whereas the state insists on the loyalty of all 
persons to central authority.”20  
According to Rubin, “democracy, in the liberal tradition, consists of procedures 
for making the government accountable to society so that society can govern itself by 
means of the state.”21  He continues to say that, “the inclusion of citizens in the polity’s 
institutions and opportunities to contest power define a democratic regime.”22  This 
means that not only must the individual cede power to the state, but also that the state 
must respect the individual and the individual’s rights.  If the state shows preference to 
one group or another and the inclusion of a certain group by the state means that they 
gain a larger share of the distribution of important material goods and non-material 
goods, including prestige, there increases the chance that “ethnic politics” will slow the 
development of democratic structures.23   
Another obstacle in developing and creating a multiethnic democratic state is the 
sheer difficulty any regime will have in promoting an all inclusive government and 
superimpose it on an ethically divided society.24  Democracy, as a concept, stresses 
majority rule, which in multiethnic societies means there will always be groups that will 
feel left out of the political realm.  Successful democracies build into their systems 
procedures and mechanisms that allow minority groups to have a voice within 
government and feel included in the overall governing process.  The single failure of 
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many states facing ethnic fragmentation has been the lack of the ruling group to allow the 
sharing of power with others within the nation-state, further disrupting any chances of 
creating a national identity.  
The democratic concept of political parties also takes on an ethnic character in 
multiethnic societies, which can hamper the development of a national identity.  These 
political parties tend to form along ethnic lines.25  According to Diamond and Plattner, 
“democratic elections take on the character of a ‘census’ and constitute a zero-sum game: 
one ethnic group or coalition or party wins by its sheer demographic weight.”26  They 
continue to argue that as these ethnic divisions come to the forefront as political parties, 
they produce “suspicion and mistrust, polarization rather than accommodation, and 
victimization rather than toleration.”27  This phenomenon has occurred and repeated itself 
throughout the Middle East and Asia; Afghanistan being a prime example today. 
With all of these impediments facing democratic development in multiethnic 
nation-states, can there ever be a chance for these issues to be solved and open the way 
for democracy to flourish?  Lipjhart argues that there needs to be four power sharing 
features of any multiethnic state for democracy to succeed; they are: a grand coalition at 
the center, minority veto powers, federalism (where ethnic cleavages are territorially 
based) to produce autonomy for groups to manage their own affairs, and proportionality 
in the distribution of legislative seats, government posts and public funds.28  These four 
factors allow minority groups to gain leeway when dealing with the center and create an 
atmosphere for mutual trust to develop between all ethnic groups.  This trust can help 
enhance the appeal of democratic rule and forge the way for the development of a 
national identity with which citizens can begin to relate.   
Thus far, the literature has argued the importance of national identity and the 
direct impact it has on democratic development.  With this idea in mind, it is important to 
stress that Afghans still see themselves as members of their respective ethnic groups and 
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have not been able to embrace a greater Afghan national identity in times other then 
conflict.  In addition to being a hindrance for the formation of a national identity, ethnic 
identity creates conditions in which individuals become more concerned with local 
politics rather than national level politics.  Afghans tend to revert to tribal and religious 
laws and codes over that of the state’s established legal system when dealing with 
disputes or when prescribing punishment for crimes.  Overall, this literature has shown 
that national identity has to be considered as a cornerstone of democratic development 
and the key component in uniting competing ethnic groups.  So far in history, this lesson 
has been lost on Afghanistan and its people.  
1. Proposition (1.1): Ethnic Fragmentation and Conflict Hinders the 
Development of a National Identity 
The major failure of democracy is ethnic conflict.29  According to Brown, states 
with “ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict than others.”30  So what causes ethnic 
conflict and how does nationalism overcome ethnic loyalties?  These questions need to be 
answered before any presumptions can be made on the chances of success or failure in 
any particular state in its effort to form a democracy.  In addition, the level of ethnic 
fragmentation of the particular state must be analyzed to further gauge the chances for 
national cohesion among the different ethnic groups.  The underlying factor is that 
“ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security in a divided society, as well as source of 
trust, certainty, reciprocal help, and protection against neglect of one’s interests by 
strangers.”31  These reasons make ethnicity a strong force of identity among humans.  
Ethnic conflict can breakout for many separate reasons.  Diamond and Plattner 
write that ethnic conflict erupts “because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues – 
basic notions of identity and the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement – the 
conflicts it generates are intrinsically less amenable to compromise than those revolving 
around material issues…at the bottom, they revolve around exclusive symbols and 
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conceptions of legitimacy, they are characterized by competing demands that cannot 
easily be broken down into bargainable increments.”32  In this theory, ethnicity is viewed 
as the individual’s and group’s identity and their view of entitlement based on that 
identity.  Real world examples of ethnic identity leading to feelings of entitlement are 
seen in Afghanistan, where the Pashtun clans of the south feel that only members of their 
tribes can be the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan, since they have been the sole producers 
of kings and emirs for the last three hundred years. 
On the other hand, according to Rubin, “ethnic conflict results from the 
integration of populations into a common territorial state, creating incentives to compete 
for control of the internationally recognized center.”33  This is true for many states today 
which are products of a mixture of many different ethnic groups forming a nation-state; 
the most prevalent examples being the African and Eastern European States of the 
twentieth century.  Most African countries remain severely divided and ethnic divisions 
have proved a major impediment to the attainment of stable democracy all over the 
continent.34  Examples in Eastern Europe have shown that “democracy progressed 
furthest in countries that had the fewest serious ethnic cleavages but slower in divided 
ones.”35  States, like Yugoslavia, fell into civil war along ethnic lines in an effort for 
different ethnic groups to gain self rule. 
Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle discovered in their studies of certain 
African and Asian states in the 1950s and 1960s, that “plural societies (essentially, deeply 
divided ones) where ethnic differences are sharpened through cohesive political 
organization, multiethnic coalitions inevitably breakdown, brokerage institutions 
disappear….issues are reflected through a prism of ethnicity, and ethnic moderation 
becomes untenable.”36  The results of Rabushka and Shepsle’s study meant that 
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“democracy was not viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences.”37  Adding 
to this notion, Powell’s study of contemporary democracies concludes that “countries 
with extreme ethnic complexity experience high levels of deadly political violence, which 
severely strains the fabric of their democratic orders.”38   
Ethnicity and the conflicts it creates, become negative variables in the 
implementation and development of democratic structures, as well as the creation of a 
national identity.  Afghanistan best illustrates this as it has attempted democratic 
development but has faced continued ethnic fighting and lack of a national identity.  In 
short, as long as individuals place ethnicity before nationalism and there is a struggle for 
power between separate groups, the creation of a democratic government is unlikely.  
This is not only seen in Africa, but also in the republics that were created after the fall of 
the Soviet Union and in the Balkans.  Given the chance, it appears that most will choose 
to side with their own ethnic groups and fight for control of the political system.  If this is 
true, then multiethnic societies that lack feelings of nationalism are not conducive to 
forming a democratic government.  These theories have demonstrated the difficulty any 
government in Afghanistan will have in fostering democratic development.   
2. Proposition (1.2): Ethnic Fragmentation within Afghanistan Hinders 
the Development of an Afghan National Identity 
a. Tribes and Tribal Dynamics 
Afghanistan is a nation-state with a diverse ethnic make-up that has 
attempted state formation on numerous occasions over the years.  These attempts have 
directly challenged the local tribal and social structures of society, eventually causing 
backlash and state failure. The underlying issue for Afghanistan’s governments has been 
their inability to create a sense of genuine national unity in times other than during 
crisis.39  The lack of nationalism compared to the deep rooted ethnic identity of the 
majority of Afghans reflects the realties of how difficult it is for ethnically fragmented 
societies to coalesce into one unified nation-state.  This shows that Afghanistan 
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“illustrates well the problems of the transition to political society, particularly with regard 
to the question of tribalism and the state,” according to Roy.40 
Afghan society today continues to live within the governing structures of 
tribes and clans.  Roy states that “the tribes see the state as existing on the periphery, 
responsible for administering land whose boundaries are constantly fluctuating on 
account of conquests carried out by the tribal confederations, in respect of which the state 
is no more than the means of continuity.”41  Rubin further develops this notion by writing 
that “the tribal model depicts tribes as largely self-governing groups of people united by a 
‘group feeling’ based on a belief in common kinships, while the state claims authority 
over society within a territory, a tribes claims jurisdiction over a set of persons bound by 
kinship relations.”42  To the tribes of Afghanistan, the central government is seen as 
nothing more than a foreign and unfamiliar power trying to take control in areas of 
society that traditionally have been governed by tribal codes and laws.  Most tribes and 
villages have remained self-sufficient and autonomous, accepting central control only 
when in their material interest or when faced with overwhelming force.43   
Further complicating the dynamics of Afghan society are the relationships 
between the tribes themselves and between the varying ethnic groups that compose the 
nation-state.  Simply put, the relationship between tribes are generally marked by 
“competition and outright animosity,” according to Christie.44  This is true of many 
nation-states, like Afghanistan, that possess large multiethnic groups within their 
boundaries.  The failure of many past Afghan regimes has been their inability to bridge 
the gap between these competing groups and their willingness to play different groups 
against each other in order to consolidate their own power.45  This exploitation of societal 
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fragmentation in order to maintain power has been one of the single most destructive 
forces that has directly countered the growth of a true nationalistic identity among the 
tribes and Afghans as a whole. 
b. Issues of Ethnicity 
Historically, Afghanistan has been ruled and governed by the Pashtun 
tribes of the south.  The Pashtuns form the largest demographic bloc within Afghanistan.  
This sheer numerical advantage has helped place them in the forefront of Afghan political 
development and rule over the last few hundred years.  Unlike other ethnic groups, the 
Pashtuns stress the importance of tribal structures much more fervently, which is evident 
from the Pashtun emphasis on genealogically defined relations and their references to 
Pashtunwali (Pashtun Tribal Code).46  This Pashtun dominance of government has 
created an atmosphere of tension between them and the remaining ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan, mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.  These tensions have led to conflict as 
well as to the introduction of repressive measures to quell the power struggle of these 
ethnic minority groups.   
Historically, the remaining ethnic groups have played certain specific roles 
within the society as a whole as well as within the government.  However, not until the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan did these other ethnic groups truly gain power 
within the overall societal structure and establish themselves as a political and military 
force that the Pashtuns could no longer ignore.  In the past, fighting for control of the 
center had occurred strictly between Pashtuns, but as these other ethnic groups rose in 
importance and made stabs at governing, there became a great struggle within 
Afghanistan that eventually led to outright civil war and the collapse of the Afghan 
government and state structure.   
Currently, as ethnicity remains at the forefront of politics, Afghanistan 
faces an extremely difficult challenge of unifying a fragmented society and fostering the 
development of a national identity.  As each ethnic group gains a foothold in government 
and tries to reduce past prejudices, there is a chance that conflict will occur as a result.  
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Since this attempt at entering government is taken from an ethnic approach, rather than a 
regional or national one, the fragmentation of society will continue until either one 
dominant ethnic group controls all of the government, or ethnic politics will make way 
for increased internal conflict and eventual open warfare.  In order not to arrive at these 
two outcomes, all of Afghanistan’s parties and political leaders need to de-emphasize 
differences within the Afghan people and being promoting a national agenda. 
c. Afghanistan and Problems of State Formation  
A modern state system and a government that is administered by a central 
authority is not a new concept to the Afghan people.   However, the recent history of 
Afghanistan is one filled with revolt against the central power and of resistance to the 
penetration of the countryside by the state bureaucracy.47   The reason for revolt has been 
due to the fact of the state coming into direct conflict with tribal and ethnic ways of life.  
In the end, “the formation and transformation of that state system created the contending 
forces of conflict,” according to Rubin.48  Simply put, the Afghans reacted only when 
direct force was applied to change the basic tribal structure within which the majority of 
Afghans had lived for generations.   
There have been many different models and forms of government 
attempted by Afghans and their rulers in the process of state formation.  These 
governments have varied from monarchies to constitutional monarchies to communist 
style regimes to an Islamic and Sharia based government.  All have failed, in their own 
way, due to their interactions with the Afghan people and in the way in which laws and 
reforms were implemented by these governments throughout the state.  Both enforcement 
of administration and jurisdiction by the state and the state’s efforts to promote national 
identity led to further cleavages and controversies between state and society as a whole.49  
In most cases, these efforts to coalesce the Afghan people into one nation were conducted 
by repression and military action.   The approach of these governments finally brought 
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the Afghan people to revolt, both on the local level as well as the national.  In the end, 
instead of forging a greater Afghan national identity among the populace, these 
governments paved the way for continued ethnic fighting and fragmentation. 
On the other hand, there have been regimes in Afghanistan’s history that 
have attempted to bring the general public into the national fold through peaceful means. 
However, Rasuly-Paleczek writes that “despite numerous attempts to integrate the 
various socio-political entities into one cohesive state machine and to create a common 
collective identity for the country’s extremely heterogeneous society, the envisaged aims 
could not be achieved.”50  This failed peaceful approach proved that ethnic ties were too 
strong for a national government to overcome in a short period of time.  The Afghans 
proved that there needed to be a process that allowed for the slow integration of all ethnic 
groups over a long period of time; this process would have to take generations to 
complete in order to be successful. 
Afghanistan confronted modernity through its forced integration into a 
Eurocentric state system as a buffer between the Russian and the British Empires.51  This 
forced process left the Afghan people with a bitter sense of feeling about modernity and 
all that it entailed.  Complicating the situation was the adoption of this modernity process 
by many Afghan leaders in recent history.  Ultimately, according to Roy, it was not 
modernization that failed the Afghans but the ruler’s notions of modernity.  Simply put, 
he argues that “it is not modernization which brings problems, but modernity, the 
hypothesis which holds that modernity must necessarily involve a ‘cultural revolution,’ a 
transformation of the way of thinking and adoption of new social paradigms.”52   
The idea of modernity brought with it new concepts to Afghanistan and its 
people, both on social levels as well as on governmental ones.  Ideas such as women’s 
rights, separation of “church” and state, property rights, implementation of secular laws, 
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and basic regulations, which were historically dealt with on the tribal level, were now 
being forced from the center outward.  Modernization was rejected by the traditionalist 
Afghans mistaking it with modernity, a social concept.  These wholesale rejections led to 
the weakening of many Afghan regimes, which were unable to bring the state out of a 
draconian mindset into a more ideologically advanced social structure and organization. 
D. PROPOSITION (2): CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND 
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT ARE CRITICAL FOR 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 
“You can not build a democratic state unless you first have a state, and the 
essential condition for a state is that it must have an effective monopoly over the means 
of violence.”53  Simply put, this idea means that the state must have authority over its 
citizens and territory for it to be able to build the foundations for democratic institutions.   
In addition, the popular support that is bestowed upon a government by the population is 
also a key factor in the development of democracy and the creation of social institutions 
that pave the way for a civil society.  Ethnic tensions and the fallout from any ethnic 
conflict, however, can derail this process and directly challenge the authority of the state  
and the government.  These conflicts can create the conditions that are conducive for the 
birth of authoritarianism, rather than democracy, and allows little room for a free form of 
government to take hold within society.54   
It is important to note that if democracy is to flourish within an ethnically 
fragmented society, Horowitz points out two major problems that too; one being majority 
rule and the other being minority rule.55  This problem of majority or minority rule 
simply means that there is a potential for one side or the other to disregard the rights of 
the segments of society that have no access to government or have any direct influence 
on the course on which the state is heading.  This can undermine the authority of the 
government and reduce the direct support from the segments of society not in power.  In  
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societies that hold strong historical ethnic animosities, like in Afghanistan, this opens the 
door for conflict and increased ethnic tension that can lead to further cleavages and 
possible state collapse. 
Charles Tilly defines states in general as “coercion-wielding organizations that are 
distant from households and kinship groupings and exercise clear priority in some respect 
over all other organizations within substantial territories.”56  This definition illustrates the 
difficulty individuals may have in accepting the authority of the state, seen as a distant 
entity. Joe Migdal writes that the “ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced 
impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies 
they have confronted and the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, 
clan leader, etc…”57  This further cements the notion of this proposition and underscores 
the difficulty a central government would have in establishing its authority in a highly 
fragmented society; like that in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, resistance to the central 
government has occurred at local levels and from different segments of society that are 
poised to lose their  power with the creation of a new and all inclusive government.   For 
these reasons, historically, Afghan rulers have all failed in their attempts to create a 
strong, independent, and central state and have not been able to attain the resources to 
accomplish such a task while in power.58   
For the average Afghan, national politics has been of little concern; however, the 
majority of Afghans are concerned with keeping the state’s influence at the local (village, 
tribe, etc.) levels as a low as possible and securing the power balance that has developed 
over the last few decades between the state and local socio-political entities.59  Generally, 
this mindset does not allow the central governments to develop the institutions of 
governing throughout the state at any level, which would allow it to become a viable 
national authority that would have the mandate to truly govern its citizens.  This deep  
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distrust of any central authority will cause a great impediment to any government 
attempting to create any genuine social and political change and bring about democratic 
development. 
In addition, tribal politics and tribal structures impact the way in which people 
view the central government and the authority which it wields.  According to Roy, 
“tribalism is seen as the survival from of a folk past,” hence making it “sub-political.”60  
In addition, the difficulty that tribalism places on any central authority to co-opt is the 
sheer nature of this social structure which as a network “has no precise geographic 
location,” which “cannot be taken over by the state.”61  Ibn Khaldun wrote that “a 
dynasty rarely established itself firmly in lands with many different tribes and groups.”62  
This is true of not only dynasties, but also of modern governments trying to establish 
legal and political control throughout a given area.  In a state like Afghanistan, when the 
government tries to undertake such actions, the process requires turning tribes into 
taxpaying peasants which represents a direct challenge by the central authority on the 
tribal structure and a direct attack on social/economic hierarchies that have existed for 
centuries.63   
All these issues combined can weaken any nation-state and the structures on 
which it relies for governing.  “When state structures weaken, violent conflict often 
follows; regional leaders become increasingly independent and, should they consolidate 
control over military assets, become virtual warlords, while criminal organizations 
become more powerful and pervasive.”64  Brown further writes that this weakening can 
cause the border to be less effectively controlled and cross border movements of militia, 
arms, drugs, smuggled goods, refuges, and migrants therefore increase, causing the state 
in question to “ultimately fragment or simply cease to exist as a political entity.”65   
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In short, these ideas help summarize the importance of establishing a central 
authority within a state that is fully supported and recognized by the populace in order to 
facilitate democratic development.  So far in Afghan history, as it will be demonstrated in 
the case studies in the next chapter, governments have not been able to garner a lasting 
popular support for themselves.  Over time, this lack of support has brought into question 
their legitimacy and ability to rule over this diverse population.  Due to this lack of 
support, most regimes reverted to ruling through non-democratic means, which simply 
reversed any democratic development that had taken place. 
1. Proposition (2.1): Ethnic Fragmentation, Tribalism and Religious 
Notions Can Challenge Government Authority and Legitimacy 
The underlying factor for the creation of ethnic conflict in the majority of multi-
ethnic societies has been the question of inclusion of all parties into the ruling structure of 
the state.  In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides a clear line to determine 
who will and who will not be excluded; these lines seem to be unalterable.66  If 
Horowitz’s theory is correct, then these unalterable lines of exclusion produced by ethnic 
differences are the single most difficult barrier for nation-states of multiple ethnic groups 
to overcome.  Diamond and Plattner continue this idea by saying, “in deeply ethnically 
divided societies, in contrast to other lines of cleavages, such as class or occupation, the 
lines appear to be permanent and all-encompassing, predetermining who will be granted 
and denied access to power and resources.”67  Further complicating this situation is the 
added historical memories of these groups, mainly the excluded or minority groups, and 
the deep rooted animosity felt towards the ruling or historically dominant group within 
the nation-state.  
In the historical context, coalescing peoples against, for example, a European 
colonial power in order to gain independence have resulted in limited success, but the 
coalescing of peoples in “nation building projects in the Third World often failed 
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miserably.”68  This was due to the fact that a common goal was lacking for individuals 
that would bond them against a greater “evil” than that of the prospects of a national 
government.  This fragmentation and lack of trust directly undermined the local 
government’s authority and its ability to function.  In addition, “many scholars have 
expressed profound skepticism about the possibility of stable democracy in societies in 
which ethnicity has become politicized” over time.69  As ethnic politics becomes ever 
more entrenched within government, this reflects among society as well, further 
fragmenting the already fragile balance that may or may not exist.  “In deeply divided 
societies, ethnic allegiances are all encompassing seeping into organizations, activities, 
and roles to which they are formally unrelated.”70  Diamond and Plattner further write 
that “the permeative character of ethnic affiliations, by infusing so many sectors of social 
life, imparts a pervasive quality to ethnic conflict and raises sharply the stakes of ethnic 
politics.”71   
At the root of the Afghan problem is the deep tribal and traditional way in which 
life is structured within society.  According to the writings of Roy, Afghanistan has been 
the prime example of the difficulty of transitioning a solely tribal based society into one 
that is governed by a central authority; a society that recognizes the laws and overriding 
political power that a state government can have over its citizens.72  In addition, the 
simple structure of Afghan society, based on family and kinship groupings, which in 
some cases do not have a specific geographic location and cannot be taken over by the 
state but are able to penetrate the “very heart of the state,” is a cause for concern in regard 
to the relationship of the state to citizens.73  In terms of state formation, this is a 
detrimental concept for the creation of stability within state structures in any given 
society.  
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Further undermining state authority and legitimacy has been the fact that 
“representative government remained an anomaly to most Afghans, who traditionally 
avoided contact with central government officials, fearing increased taxes, conscription, 
and other forced labor.”74  These fears, compounded with past experiences of abuse of 
the rural population, have and will for the foreseeable future, raise doubts in the minds of 
Afghans on the true intentions of any central authority and create a slower pace in which 
individual Afghans will succumb to the direct involvement of a central power in their 
lives.  This process, over time, can only lead to weaken the Afghan state which will be 
unable to consolidate power.  “When states are weak, individual groups within these 
states feel compelled to provide for their own defense…if the state in question is very 
weak or it is expected to become weak over time, the incentives for groups to make 
independent military preparations grow.”75  This could open the door to civil conflict or 
even outright civil war within a state and can eventually lead to a failed state scenario.  
Afghanistan, today, faces this prospect as the central political structure still remains 
fragile and is having a difficult time in gaining the support from the periphery of Afghan 
society.   
State formation and Afghanistan can not be discussed without studying the impact 
of religion on society.  In short, religion is an important factor in Afghanistan in regards 
to state formation and internal politics.  Theoretically, democracies are void of any direct 
influence on religion in government, but Afghan history has shown that when religion has 
been sidelined by government, it has caused a great uproar and eventual backlash from 
within society.  “When the rural or to a less extent, the urban population, but especially, 
the religious tribal leadership, has perceived an internal challenge to its authority the 
opposition to that challenge has been clothed in Islamic garb.”76  Simply put, “Afghan 
peasant life is permeated by religion; it provides the intellectual horizon, the system of 
values and the code of behavior, even though occasionally this may involve a clash with 
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other codes of conduct such as tribal system, it provides the only source of legitimization 
based upon universal values.”77  For any government to be viable in the Afghan state 
today, the importance of Islam to the Afghans must be considered, or the prospects of 
creating a secular democracy based on Western ideals has a minimal chance of success.   
Over the years, Islam has been the foundation for unity of Afghanistan’s diverse 
and multiethnic peoples while jihad has frequently provided the principle mobilizing 
factor for Afghan nationalism.78  This dynamic has also helped, in the past, to unite 
disparate groups, “some often antagonistic to each other, bound by Islam” to wage battle 
against the same enemy, be it an external threat or the central government.79  Realizing 
this phenomenon, Islam has been used by Afghan rulers, not only to legitimize their own 
rule, but to reinforce the notion and the authority of the state and its institutions upon the 
Afghan people.  In eventuality, when forced to choose sides between the central authority 
and religious obligations, the Afghans have always sided with God.  Over time, this 
dynamic had forced previous Afghan regimes to attempt to legitimize basic laws and 
overriding central authority through religion.  Olesen writes that “through the nineteenth 
century, the legitimacy of power has almost constantly been at issue, both in the tribal 
mode as well as in any Islamic variant” with the “ultimate source of legitimacy being 
Allah.”80  
Ethnic fragmentation, however, does not automatically condemn a state to 
eventual failure.  “The presence of even severe ethnic divisions need not condemn a 
country to ethnic violence and instability if it adopts political institutions that offer 
incentives for accommodation rather than polarization.”81  This successful 
implementation of policies and incentives is more likely to be successful in states that, 
even though they have a great ethnic diversity within society, have a greater historical 
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tradition of representative government.  States that lack such political traditions must 
have political structures that are extremely accommodating to all ethnic groups, thus 
allowing for political and civic growth among the population as a whole over an extended 
period of time. 
Ethnic fragmentation, tribalism and religious notions of governing have all been a 
part of the Afghan experience for hundreds of years.  As demonstrated in this chapter and 
in the case studies that will be presented in the next chapter, these ideas have all had a 
hand in shaping the way in which Afghans have interacted with their governments 
overtime and the degree in which these governments were viewed as legitimate by the 
population.  Government authority in Afghanistan cannot be fully established unless 
these ideas are co-opted or are willingly abandoned by Afghans keen on the creation of a 
government which is able to foster democratic development.    
E. SUMMARY 
Ethnicity and the issues that arise from ethnic fragmentation are key factors 
challenging any nation-state that is attempting to construct modern state institutions and 
norms.  Nation-states with more than one ethnic group that still rely on tribal structures 
find it more difficult to accomplish this task.  This has been the case, not only in 
Afghanistan, but also in Africa, Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe.  As long as groups, 
within the state, place a greater importance on their ethnic identity than their national one, 
there will always be conflicting loyalties which allows for possible conflict to erupt.  
Afghanistan has become an example of how these propositions demonstrate that ethnicity 
can directly impact state formation and determine the success or failure of government. 
In summary, according to Griffiths, Afghanistan’s two main problems are “the 
real task its government has in establishing the unity of the peoples and the minorities 
question.”82  He continues to say that conflicting “pressures, social and economic, of 
traditionalism and modernization, and the difficulties imposing sophisticated political 
methods and institutions on old tribal loyalties and attitudes,” leads to political disarray 
within Afghanistan’s governments, past and present.83  Compounding these problems has 
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been the introduction of models of governance and nation-building that is alien to Afghan 
rulers and their society, values and traditions.84   
Over the past one hundred years, national politics have not been of much concern 
to the ordinary Afghan, who made decreasing the state’s influence at local levels his 
number one priority.85  This constant deflection of central authority in the everyday lives 
of the Afghans allowed for traditional governing structures to remain and slowed their 
evolution to more modern systems.  As the central government fought to gain access to 
these local structures of governance, it was met with increased resistance and eventual 
revolt.  The cycle repeated itself over many different Afghan regimes using varying 
models of government.   
The challenge now facing the current Afghan government is the task of uniting 
the Afghan people while not repeating the mistakes of the past.  The concept of national 
identity needs to be bolstered, but not at the expense of marginalizing ethnic traditions 
and norms that are valued deeply by the Afghan people.  This tightrope act will, in the 
end, determine whether Afghanistan can succeed in forming a modern nation-state with 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last one hundred years of Afghan history have been filled with numerous 
examples of governments attempting to create cohesive and all encompassing state 
structures modeled after Western nation-states.  The cases in this chapter will show how 
different regimes have attempted this process and how they have failed, either by 
disenfranchising the population, as a whole, or by creating a rift between the government 
and religious/traditional authorities in rural areas.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Afghanistan is an extremely heterogeneous society comprised by many different ethnic 
groups, as well as many different Islamic sects, be it Shia, Sunni, or Sufi, which affects 
the way in which people interact with each other and government.  Further complicating 
this process of attempted state formation is the deep reliance of Afghans on tribal and 
ethnic hierarchical structures, making it difficult for the creation of a strong central 
authority that is seen as legitimate in its rule throughout the state.  All these conditions 
have made it nearly impossible for regimes to first, implement reform and modernization 
packages that would be widely accepted at all levels of society and second, to create an 
overriding national Afghan identity among the population in times other than conflict or 
war.   
Four former Afghan regimes will be analyzed and will be compared to the current 
regime.  The goal of this chapter will be to analyze each former regime by using this 
thesis’s two main and three sub-propositions and try to illustrate how they reflect on the 
former regimes in regards to their reform programs, their foreign policy issues, economic 
agendas and religious interactions while still trying to govern over this ethnically 
fragmented society.  When a proposition becomes relevant within the context of the 
writings, it will be denoted at the end of that particular section or sentence by using the 
proposition’s number.  In the end, this process will help pinpoint certain trends that occur 
within Afghanistan that can be applied to today’s government, to gauge the overall 
chances for success or failure at the attempt to unify the Afghan people under one 
national identity and create the proper conditions for the development of democratic 
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institutions.  To remind the reader of this thesis’s propositions, they are redisplayed as 
Figure 4: Propositions, on this page.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Propositions  
 
Specifically, the four former regimes that will be analyzed will be the Habibullah 
Khan Regime, which lasted from 1901 to 1919, the Amanullah Khan Regime, which was 
in power from 1919 to 1929, the Zahir Shah Regime, which lasted from 1933 all the way 
to 1973, and the Muhammad Daoud Khan Regime, which was in power from 1973 to 
1978.  These former regimes represent a broad spectrum of governing styles and 
government structures, ranging from Western models to basic monarchies, which allows 
for a wider range of variables that can be studied and analyzed over time. 
B. AMIR HABIBULLAH KHAN 1901-1919 
Habibullah Khan came to power in 1901 in a fairly uncontested fashion, which 
was rare up to this point in Afghan history.  The death of his father, Abdur Rahman, 
placed Habibullah at the helm of a nation that was technologically backwards, 
underdeveloped, and still under the strong influence of foreign powers, mainly that of 
Great Britain.  Initially, Habibullah was considered to be fortunate to have inherited, 
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thanks to his father’s repressive policies, an Afghanistan that had little to no internal 
unrest.86  However, as the years went along, there arose three significant points of 
contention between Habibullah and the Afghan people that would eventually create the 
conditions for his downfall and eventual overthrow.  The most significant of these issues 
was his foreign policy challenges, which in the end, opened the door for his religious 
authority and legitimacy to come into question. (P2)  In addition, also based on his 
foreign policy challenges, Habibullah would face a growing feeling of nationalism within 
Afghanistan and an ever growing discontent between him and the ruling tribal elites.  
Lastly, his modernization efforts throughout society would bring him into direct conflict 
with religious authorities and again with the tribal elites. (P2.1) 
Habibullah began his reign by trying to reinforce his legitimacy through religion. 
(P2.1)  This concept was very important for all past Afghan rulers before Habibullah, as 
well as future ones, for Islam had always been at the center of the lives of ordinary 
Afghans.87  According to Rashid, “Islam had been the bedrock for the unity of 
Afghanistan’s diverse and multi-ethnic people.”88 (P2.1)  Upon his coronation, 
Habibullah took on the title of Amir (a religious nomenclature), rather than Shah, to 
reemphasis, again, the point that his rule was legitimized through religion.  For this 
reason, initially the notion that the “divine source of the Amir’s power and his principle 
duty as guardian of the Islamic country of Afghanistan against foreign threats” was 
widely accepted by the Afghan people, according to Shahrani. 89  Habibullah was also 
bestowed with the title of Sirja al-Millat-I wad Din, the Light of the Nation and of the 
Faith, by the traditionalist ulema (Islamic scholars).90  Now that Habibullah’s faith as a 
ruler was tied directly to Islam, little did he realize that his relationship with the British 
during World War I would cause a religious uproar that would spread throughout the 
nation and eventually undermine his authority as a ruler. (P2.1) 
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Afghanistan, like many other Muslim nations of the time, was going through a 
revival of pan-Islamism and anti-colonialism.  According to Adamec, “domestically, the 
Afghan ruler faced a population that was gradually becoming politicized by fear of 
foreign domination which forced many to look straight in the ideologies of pan-Islamism 
and nationalism.”91 (P1 & P2.1)  Seeing the possible challenge to his authority coming 
from the ulema, which was now gaining greater power throughout society, Habibullah 
began initiatives to co-opt these religious authorities, like his father had before him, and 
curtail their independent actions. (P2.1)  He did this by bringing them within the state 
apparatus and institutionalizing their outputs by creating a board of seven to eight ulema 
whose sole function it was to ensure that the official policies of the state were in 
accordance to Islam.92  In addition, large portions of the “frontier” territories were placed 
under the religious jurisdiction of this newly created board, showing Habibullah’s 
willingness to, initially, please the broader religious base within Afghanistan, but also 
keeping a direct control over it at the same time.93 (P2 & P2.1) 
Before analyzing the foreign policy issues that became the largest source of de-
legitimization of Habibullah in the eyes of the Afghans, their needs to be a discussion of 
the domestic issues that contributed to his failed regime.  Habibullah was characterized as 
a tolerant and good-natured man.94  For this reason, he began setting back some of the 
more repressive policies of his father, like reducing the most “barbarous methods of 
punishment” in Afghan prisons.95  He relaxed the “much resisted system of compulsory 
military service, established a State Council to handle tribal affairs, and introduced a 
system whereby tribal representatives could participate in the adjudication of tribal cases 
by provincial authorities,” states Olesen.96 (P2)  For an outside observer of the time, 
these might have seemed like huge steps forward for Afghanistan, but under the surface, 
the entire system was still built around the absolute rule of Habibullah.  In addition, he 
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refined the “judicial authority and administrative policies of the state and created 
Afghanistan’s first parliament, which was nothing more than a thirty man advisory 
council appointed by him,” according to Roberts.97  Finally, Habibullah began a 
campaign to modernize the Afghan education system, basing it on a 4 year curriculum 
covering religious topics, Persian, math, and geography, which would be taught at the 
first Afghan secondary school (strictly for boys) started in 1904.98 
All these steps brought Habibullah into direct conflict with three separate groups 
within Afghanistan.  These groups were the religious authorities and ulema, the rural 
ruling class, known as the khans, and Afghan traditionalists. (P2.1)  Not all reforms 
affected each group equally, but the combined effects of the reforms and the eventual 
coalition formed in opposition to counter Habibullah would create a strong force within 
Afghanistan.  The strongest “party” within this grouping would be the religious 
authorities.  They took offense to the new education plan set in motion by the king.  
Olesen writes that “education, up to this point, had been entirely within the religious 
dominion, but with these reforms, education became directly subject to the polity-
expansion of the state through the foundation of a governmental school system.”99 (P2.1) 
For these religious authorities, Islamic learning was important, because this knowledge 
helped strengthen the believers against “infidel” ideas.  Opening the door to Western 
thought would be corrupting Afghans with un-Islamic notions and ideas, creating a 
weaker society which would be easier to dominate by outside powers.  This became the 
overriding feeling of the religious class and ulema.   
These reforms meant that the long lasting warm relations between Habibullah and 
Afghanistan’s ulema were beginning to cool.  An example of how the ulema began 
working against Habibullah can be best illustrated by the events that occurred during a 
state visit to India, in 1907, when Habibullah was reported to have been initiated into the 
Freemasons society.100 (P2.1)  Back in Afghanistan, this news was quickly used within 
religious circles to promote the idea that the Amir, the “Light of the Nation and of the 
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Faith,” had turned to Christianity and was willing to deal, if not simply handover 
Afghanistan, to foreign forces.  These allegations were “quickly ended, when on his 
return, Habibullah had four mullahs hanged for spreading these rumors,” writes 
Olesen.101  As the ulema were turning against the Amir, so were the remaining segments 
of society. (P1.1, P1.2 & P2.1) 
At this critical time, Habibullah’s social reforms were taking an effect, and the 
“urban conditions began to improve, however this was only true in Kabul,” according to 
Shahrani.102  Also, the Amir was becoming more preoccupied with organizing his court 
and leisure activities and less concerned about the overall state of affairs within 
Afghanistan.  These reforms and court expenses were not cheap, and what eventually 
occurred was that “tax collection became the major task of the government, which in 
turn, created conditions for corruption, bribery, extortion, and fraud,” writes Shahrani.103  
(P2)  This corruption and the abuse by central government officials of their positions 
paved the way for a major popular uprising of protest, in both the Paktya (1912-13) and 
Kandahar (1912) Provinces.  The fallout resulted in the removal of certain government 
official from their positions, but no specific punishment was prescribed for their 
crimes.104  This deeply angered tribal officials and, according to them, showed 
Habibullah’s lack of concern over the state of the inefficient central government and his 
inability to provide for the general population. (P2) 
The one issue that became the catalyst for Habibullah’s removal was a result of 
the relationship between Afghanistan and Britain and the fallout from Habibullah’s 
stance during World War I.  At the time of his reign, there began to appear a nationalistic 
force within Afghanistan.105 (P1)  This was due to the continual British control of certain 
aspects of Afghanistan’s government, mainly its foreign policy.  This control resulted 
after the Afghan-British Treaty of Gandamak, which gave Britain full control of every 
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facet of Afghanistan’s foreign policy.  With Britain entering World War I and eventually, 
the Ottoman Empire joining the opposite side, Habibullah was forced to make a decision 
in regards to which side Afghanistan would support.  
Complicating the situation for the Amir was the call for jihad (holy war) by the 
Ottoman Caliph against the Allied Forces.  This reinforced the feelings of many Afghans 
that the great powers were launching another crusade against the Islamic world and the 
call for jihad had to be heeded.106  However, pressured by Britain, Habibullah declared 
Afghanistan’s neutrality for the duration of the conflict.  According to Ewans, “this 
created a widespread belief that Afghanistan had betrayed her Islamic principles and had 
failed to grasp the opportunity to become fully independent” from Britain.107 (P2.1)  By 
denying this appeal from the Caliph, Habibullah risked accusations of being labeled a 
heretic by the religious authorities already opposed to him.108 (P2 & P2.1) 
As the war progressed, Habibullah’s continued loyalty “to the Allies aroused 
bitterness and resentment among the country’s tribal and religious leaders and among the 
emerging intellectual elite,” writes Roberts.109 (P2.1)  A British observer of the time 
wrote that, in Kabul, “almost everyone was strongly anti-British and pro-Turkish, except 
the Amir, who seldom spoke in public” about the continuing war in Europe.110  This pro-
British stance would bring together the groups opposing the Amir, that otherwise would 
not have formed a coalition, to include tribal leaders, religious traditionalists, and even 
the Amir’s own brother.111 (P2 & P2.1) 
Realizing the growing threat to himself and his monarchy, Habibullah requested, 
from the British, total independence in both external and internal matters as a reward for 
his neutrality in World War I.  By staying out of the war, Habibullah allowed the British 
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to fully concentrate military forces in Europe and not have forces bogged down in Central 
Asia.  However, the British were beginning to worry about the growing Bolshevik threat 
in the region and according to Ewans, “dragged their feet in giving him a response.”112  
This delay by the British was seen as a rejection by the people of Afghanistan and as the 
final straw in Habibullah’s rule.  He was murdered in his sleep while away from Kabul 
on a hunting trip in February 1919.113 
Habibullah’s rise and fall helped illustrate the dynamics of certain aspects of 
Afghan culture and how it related to the center, in other words, how it related to the rule 
of the leader.  According to Olesen, “foreign political issues were dominating the internal 
Afghan debate and left many traces in the political as well as the intellectual life of the 
period.”114 (P2)  Shahrani writes, that the Amir’s power was challenged, “not for the 
injustices to the majority of rural populations, but for its autocratic nature and for his 
devotion to the pursuit of a policy of friendship with the British during World War I, at 
the expense of Afghanistan’s external independence.”115 (P2) This opposition was not, 
like in Afghanistan’s past, tied to dynastic challenges, but to the ideals of 
constitutionalism, nationalism, reformism, and finally Islamic modernism.116 (P1, P1.1. 
P1.2, & P2)  In the end, Habibullah managed to establish the pattern for Afghan politics 
that is still present today.  The government came to be seen as the prime modernizing 
agent, which meant that it had to “balance between the demands of the modernizing elite 
for more rapid progress and great political participation and the conservative and 
religious concerns of the vast majority of the population.”117 (P1.1, P1.2 & P2.1)  If 
Habibullah had been able to walk this tightrope he would, undoubtedly, have survived  
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and continued implementing his gradual reforms throughout Afghanistan and would have 
spared the nation from the ultra-fast modernization programs and reforms of his son 
Amanullah Khan.   
C. AMANULLAH KHAN 1919-1929 
Amanullah Khan came to power shortly after his father’s death in 1919.  By being 
in Kabul during Habibullah’s ill-fated hunting trip, Amanullah had the full control of the 
state’s arsenal and treasury, which enabled him, through a judicious pay increase, to buy 
the loyalty of the Kabul garrison. 118  This made it difficult for anyone to directly 
challenge his claim to the throne.  Olesen writes that “Amanullah, initially, enjoyed 
widespread respect and support in religious circles, as he was recognized as a strong pan-
Islamist and nationalist and had, in his administrative work as governor of Kabul, gained 
the reputation for personal honesty and integrity.”119 (P2)  By winning the support of 
religious and tribal factions within Afghanistan, Amanullah guaranteed there would be no 
one that could directly challenge his claim as the new leader of the state.  After living 
under the rule of Habibullah, Afghans were now relieved that the nation, in their view, 
would be brought back to the right path of Islamic governance and finally be able to 
claim full independence from foreign powers.  Time, however, would demonstrate that 
they would be correct in only one of these assumptions.   
Recognizing the growing trend of Afghan nationalism, Amanullah’s first 
proclamation, after his coronation, was a promise of total independence for Afghanistan; 
which could be seen as the only serious issue that could have united the traditionalists 
and modern nationalists under one banner.120 (P1 & P1.2)  Amanullah hoped that this 
cause would create, according to Shahrani, “a sense of nationality and nationhood that 
would transcend ethnicity and other claims of distinctiveness.”121  (P1 & P1.1)  His 
proclamation was quickly followed by a letter to the British viceroy of India, informing 
him of Habibullah’s death and declaring Afghanistan an independent and free nation-
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state.  Shortly afterwards, in another proclamation, he announced to the Afghan people 
the contents of the letter, which specified that Afghanistan was now entirely free, 
autonomous and independent, both internally and externally, and that it was now the 
appropriate time for a jihad against the British.122   
These steps were taken by Amanullah who understood that he needed to maintain 
the loyalties of the religious class, as well as cater to the wishes of the modernist who 
yearned to have a free Afghanistan. (P2 & P2.1)  With the beginning of the Third Anglo-
Afghan War, the entire country was united behind the new king and his popularity grew 
to new heights.  Through this war, Amanullah had established his position in the Muslim 
world as an anti-imperialistic ruler and a prescriber to militant pan-Islamic ideals.  Under 
all of this rhetoric, however, was his desire to claim lands past the Durand Line, 
separating British India and Afghanistan, which had been a part of the Afghan kingdom 
at one point in history.  In the end, the war was a drain on Afghanistan’s already dismal 
economy and Amanullah was unable to capture any new lands in the area of modern day 
Pakistan.  Eventually, he gave up his ideas for territorial expansion, and in return, the 
British recognized Afghanistan’s independence in both internal and external affairs.123 
Amanullah had achieved his overriding goal of winning independence from 
Britain.  Adamec writes that now, “he began to devote all of his energies to initiating 
comprehensive political, administrative, and social reforms.”124  His reign would have 
two phases of reforms, one created shortly after the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, 
and a second, after a long and extravagant tour, taken by him, to visit European and 
Middle Eastern capitals.  Prior to 1924, with the recollection of winning independence 
still refresh in the memories of Afghans, many of the king’s political and social reforms 
were initially welcomed by many from different segments of Afghan society.125 (P2)  His 
reforms, according to Rubin, “resembled those that had transformed other absolutist 
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states into nation-states and included radical new measures in all three areas identified by 
Migdal as necessary to the reconstitution of social control: taxes, land tenure, and 
transportation.”126 
If these reforms had been carried out to their full extent, there could have been a 
chance to transform the peasant/tribal rural society into an open, commercial society 
linked to both the state and the market.127  However, these reforms and modernization 
programs were done without any long term planning and any regard to the capability of 
the state having enough resources, both in the financial sense as well as human capital.128  
Afghanistan again was being forced to change from the top down and would suffer the 
“growing pains” of this process at all levels of society.   
The first step taken by Amanullah was the creation of a representative body to 
help share the responsibilities of running the day to day operations of the Afghan 
government. (P2)  With this new body of representatives standing by, Amanullah drafted 
a new Afghan constitution in 1923.  In this constitution, he tried to create the Turkish 
model, which meant that Afghanistan would be a secular state within which the 
“monarchy and government could operate” and a clear separation of religion and state 
would be present, according to Ewans.129  Under this new constitution, “Islam and the 
nation as a source of legitimacy were not integrated and instead, the model of the 
legitimate transmissions of power became dualistic; meaning there were two separate 
sources of legitimacy.”130 (Figure 5) 
                                                 
126 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2002), 55. 
127 Ibid, 55. 
128 Nazif M. Shahrani, “State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan,” in The State, 
Religion, and Ethnic Politics of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, eds. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 47. 
129 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics (New York: Perennial, 
2001), 128. 







Figure 5.   Government Legitimacy Under Amanullah Khan 
(From: Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, 122) 
 
Modernists were unhappy with this system, since it still allowed for concessions 
to religious concepts, while the traditionalists took exception to the idea that the state 
might have a partly secular basis, rather than being under the expression of divine will.131  
(P2.1)  Amanullah further created animosity, on the religious front, by creating an 
independent judiciary and penal system based on a secular code. (P2.1)  To address the 
concerns of the ulema, however, the new constitution stated that “all cases would be 
decided in accordance with the principles of Sharia (Islamic Law) and the general civil 
and criminal laws.”  This usage of a dual system of guiding principles for judicial matters 
angered many, believing that the king had opted to use Western ideals in conjunction 
with Islamic ones, therefore, by default, placing worldly manmade laws at the same level 
as those of God’s. (P2 & P2.1)  This resulted in religious demonstrations, in 1928, where 
the text of the new constitution was thrown to the ground in protest and was denounced 
as a communist publication.132  (P2.1) 
Aside from legal reforms, Amanullah tackled many social issues, including that of 
the women’s rights.  According to Olesen, he wanted women “to become equal citizens 
and, although Islam was the official religion of the state, citizens of other religions were 
                                                 
131 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics (New York: Perennial, 
2001), 128. 
132 Ibid, 128. 
49 
to enjoy the equal right and liberty of faith.” 133  This concept of equal rights was new for 
Afghanistan, which up to this point in history was a tribal kingdom of Pashtuns that had 
controlled the military and political power of the state since the Durrani Empire.134 (P1, 
P1.2 & P2.1) By leveling the playing field and allowing all ethnicities equal rights, 
Amanullah undermined the power of the Pashtun tribal chiefs and leaders, who up to this 
point had not shared their control of state institutions with any other ethnic groups. (P1.1 
& P1.2)  These steps were taken so that instead of using Islam as a source of national 
cohesiveness, Amanullah tried to use Afghan national identity based on citizenship as the 
sole source for unifying the nation-state. (P1)  This proved to be impossible in a society 
that was extremely heterogeneous and had established ethnic hierarchies. (P1.1 & P1.2) 
Up to this point in history, many Afghan rulers had maintained their power “through a 
skillful divide-and-rule strategy vis-à-vis the different tribes and religious ethnic groups,” 
writes Olesen.135 
Education was also addressed by Amanullah.  He opened many new secondary 
schools, including a few for girls, and started a program of sending students abroad to 
continue their education.  Students were being taught secular and vocational topics rather 
than religious ones.  Also, religious education came under the direct control of the state 
by the forced schooling of mullahs and new education standards were established for the 
newly trained mullahs, who would be the only ones eligible to become Islamic judges, 
known as qazis.136  These secular measures created a widespread belief that what 
Amanullah was trying to accomplish was incompatible with Islam and united many tribal 
and religious leaders against him.137  (P2.1) 
As for challenging the tribal hierarchy, Amanullah’s measures on taxation, 
conscription, and women’s rights brought him into direct conflict with many of 
Afghanistan’s well established social norms and ethnic traditions.  First and foremost, by 
addressing women’s rights, Amanullah was seen as challenging the full authority of a 
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man over his family; which was seen as a violation of the religious notion of the sanctity 
of the family.  In addition, Amanullah’s actions were seen as a violation of one of the 
basic concepts of Pashtunwali, which allowed for the total sovereignty of the family 
patriarch, in actions and decisions, over the individual, the family and the lineage.138  In 
Afghan society, women are seen as a embodying the nang (disgrace) and namus 
(honor/chastity) of the entire kin-based social group.  By dictating measures to 
circumnavigate these traditional social barriers, Amanullah directly challenged the 
Pashtun male and Pashtun tribal structure and for this, was keenly resisted at all levels.  
(P1.2 & P2.1) 
In addition, Amanullah terminated feudal allowances and established local 
administrative divisions, undercutting local power brokers.139  Rubin writes, “Amanullah 
regularized the system of taxation, abolishing tax farming and requiring all taxes to be 
paid in cash to the government directly.”140  This left many local khans out of the loop 
and disrupted the local power structures that had been established for centuries.  These 
new governmental organizations created to maintain revenue flow brought with them 
problems of corruption and abuse of power.  In traditional Afghan society, corruption to a 
certain extent was allowed in order to facilitate transactions and was seen as a system of 
favors and counter-favors between kinsmen; however, now with new government 
officials abusing the system, there was no way in which these traditional tribal favor 
relationships could function.141  (P2.1) 
All of these new sweeping changes eventually led to a revolt, beginning in the 
Khowst and Paktya Provinces. (P2.1) This uprising, in 1924, was led by a religious 
leader, Mullah Lang, demanding Amanullah rescind many of these new reforms that were 
seen as un-Islamic and Western influenced.  The resistance lasted approximately nine 
months and proved the ineptness of Amanullah’s armed forces; for he had to eventually 
call upon local tribes in the region to put down the rogue religious elements.  This whole 
event succeeded in damaging Amanullah’s prestige and forced him to call upon a loya                                                  
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jirga (grand council of tribal elders) to review the causes of the revolt. (P2)  It quickly 
became apparent to the king, unlike the loya jirga that helped draft the 1923 constitution; 
this one would not be as friendly towards him. 
Many of Amanullah’s reforms were eventually endorsed during the meetings, 
however new changes were also introduced.  Of the more notable changes was an 
amendment reestablishing the qazi’s power to determine punishment in criminal cases, 
making official the Hanafi code of Islam as the only religious code of the entire nation, 
and reintroduction of discrimination against non-Muslim minorities, by creating an 
infidel tax and special dress code.142 (P1 & P2.1)  All of these concessions allowed 
Amanullah leeway in governing and created a brief time period in which the king and his 
opposition enjoyed cordial relations.  This would soon change with the departure of 
Amanullah on his Grand Tour of Europe and the Middle East in 1927. 
King Amanullah became extremely inspired and motivated by what he had seen 
during his journey, especially of the modern advances that were taking place under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran.  He had seen first-hand 
what a strong reform program could accomplish and believed that his previous reforms 
had not gone far enough.  On his return, he enacted new reforms that were much broader 
based than the past reforms and were intended to be implemented over a shorter period of 
time.  His first order of business was the summoning of another loya jirga, where all 
tribal leaders were humiliated by being forced to wear Western clothes and get hair/beard 
cuts.143   
He announced that Afghanistan needed to catch-up to the West and become a 
more advanced nation, which meant it would need a new and more liberal constitution.144  
This did not cause as much of a stir as his new social reforms package did, which 
included strict monogamy for government officials, a minimum age for marriage, further 
education for women, the abolition of the veil and strict adherence to the wearing of 
Western clothes in public throughout Kabul, education for mullahs, the creation of a 
secular law school, the complete liquidation of the wapf (religious endowments), the 
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abolition of pir and murids from the army, and the banning of mullahs educated in 
Deobandi (not only one of the most highly respected Islamic schools, but also the seat of 
anti-British activities).145 (P2.1) This was seen as nothing less than a declaration of war 
in the eyes of the religious establishment. 
Many mullahs, including the chief qazi of Kabul, began a petition against the 
reforms, but were quickly arrested and tried for treason, eventually being executed.  With 
this, religious and tribal leaders came together believing that it “was now or never to 
defend themselves against the folly of the monarch,” writes Olesen.146  (P2.1)  Stories 
that the king had converted to Catholicism and had become deranged through drinking 
alcohol and eating pork spread like wildfire throughout Kabul and the countryside.147  A 
revolt began and eventually Kabul fell.  Amanullah quickly moved to rescind many of the 
reforms that had been enacted, but it was too late to save his throne.  In January of 1929, 
he officially abdicated and fled Kabul, leaving his brother as the new king, who only 
survived three days in the position.148  Afghanistan had been turned into a test bed for 
Amanullah’s ideas of development and Westernization, which eventually ended in 
disaster. 
“Amanullah was a man blinded by his own egotism and fascination with the west 
into launching an ill-advised and overambitious set of reforms that his people were not 
prepared or ready to accept,” writes Edwards.149 (P2)  A Russian envoy of the time was 
recorded to have said “the tragedy of Amanullah’s case lay in the fact that he undertook 
bourgeois reforms without the existence of any national bourgeoisie in the country.”150  
The controversial nature of some of his reforms, mainly those dealing with women’s 
rights, religion, and social structures, were too much to bear for the extremely 
conservative Afghan society of the time. (P2.1)  By promoting his reforms, Amanullah 
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took on the traditional power structures, the tribal and religious leaders, and threatened 
them with a serious loss of wealth, status, and privilege.151  (P2.1) 
The outright attempt to create a nation of Afghan citizens had little acceptance in 
many levels of society.  By trying to copy Mustafa Kemal’s model for Turkey, Olesen 
writes, “Amanullah forgot that for centuries Turkey had been subjected to 
Europeanization, did not have tribes of any strength, had a well-ordered and centralized 
apparatus of power and had a strong and loyal army.”152 (P1, P1.1 & P1.2)  Afghanistan 
had none of these conditions present at the time Amanullah had taken power.  Nation and 
citizen had no meaning to the ordinary Afghan, who was living in a society that had 
structures built around a strict relationship within tribe and clan and along ethnic lines.  
(P1 & P1.2) 
In the end, Amanullah was seen as having assaulted all segments of society in one 
way or the other.  This helped alienate him from the general population, who had initially 
stood behind their king with his victory over the British and the winning of true Afghan 
independence.  Amanullah’s downfall occurred because his reforms moved too quickly, 
they were done without the necessary finances and without the existence of any social 
groups that could support such reforms, and without an efficient central administration 
that could oversee the entire process which had legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan 
people.153 (P2)  Finally, the added appearance of the un-Islamic nature of these reforms 
and policies resulted in Amanullah losing his Islamic credentials and becoming viewed as 
an illegitimate ruler. 
D. MUHAMMAD ZAHIR SHAH 1933-1973 
Muhammad Zahir Shah was only nineteen years old when he was crowned as the 
new King of Afghanistan, following the assassination of his father Nadir Shah.  Since he 
was young and inexperienced, his uncles were left to rule the state and Zahir willingly 
left governmental affairs to be run by his close relatives.154  This theme of allowing 
uncles and family members to rule the state and conduct the day to day affairs of the 
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Afghan government would be repeated many times during Zahir’s reign.  This problem 
arose from Zahir’s own personality, which according to Edwards, presented a man that 
was not prepossessing, and “many in Afghanistan believed that his apparent weakness 
and unwillingness to rule with a strong hand started in motion the disastrous decline that 
accumulated” in his overthrow in 1973 and the following twenty years of civil war.155   
Zahir began his reign with the support of many of the traditionalist and Islamist 
forces that had, a few short years ago, helped remove King Amanullah from the throne. 
(P2)  For this reason, Islam was invoked at every opportunity by Zahir and his uncles 
who regarded the religion as a source of national unity and a critical force preserving 
national independence; independence in the face of the European imperialism of the time 
period.156  However, in private, Zahir was quoted to have said that “the strength of 
Muslim faith in Afghanistan did not necessarily guarantee stability and national unity” 
and religious forces and fervor could be “suborned to unworthy purposes.”157 (P2.1) This 
conflict would eventually become more apparent following 1963, when Zahir finally 
truly took power over the Afghan government, with the removal of the Prime Minister, 
and tried to create a new constitutional monarchy that had little use for Islam.   
However, during the early years of his rule, Zahir Shah continued the tradition of 
establishing Islam as the core subject taught at schools across the country, with secular 
topics being a close second.  By not directly attacking educational issues, Zahir Shah was 
able to reduce tensions between the Afghan government and traditionalist forces, and 
created a period of time in which there was relative peace within the country.  In the end 
though, there were those that hoped secular education would eventually help weaken the 
traditionalist forces within Afghanistan.158 (P2.1) 
From 1933 to 1963, the education system of Afghanistan, under Zahir Shah, 
created semiliterate bureaucrats that were filling the expanding government 
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administration apparatus at all levels.159  This system of education, originally designed to 
help achieve national unity through religion and the training of loyal patriotic citizens, 
failed miserably.  Coinciding with this failed education system was the initial beginnings 
of a noted change in the outlook of the urban Afghan society.  The slow growth of the 
urban middle class created individuals that demanded, more and more, for political 
change in terms of the creation of a parliamentary democracy and the increase of civil 
rights.160  (P2) Recognizing the growing tension within society and the inability of the 
current system to survive for an extended period of time, Zahir took action to control the 
Afghan government and tried to create a system that would help transform Afghanistan, 
eventually, into a democracy. (P2) 
In 1963, Zahir Shah officially removed his cousin and brother-in-law, Muhammad 
Daoud Khan, from his position as Prime Minister and took the first steps to establishing a 
constitutional monarchy.  According to Griffiths, “he deliberately abandoned two 
hundred years of autocratic rule and diminished his own personal power in order to give 
his country a system of government which could not survive as an absolute monarchy or 
from the stresses of the twentieth century.161  This change was revolutionary for 
Afghanistan, since nothing like it had ever taken place before.  Zahir’s decision to 
introduce this new form of government, that was more representative, was recognition 
that as the activities and size of the nation-state enclave expanded, it needed new forms of 
legitimization among both the traditionalists and intellectuals.162 (P2 & P2.1) 
Zahir Shah was quick to begin the process of creating a new constitution that 
would help bring about the desired changes within Afghan society.  A seven man 
committee was established, including one French constitutional advisor, and began work 
on creating a draft constitution which eventually was turned over to a thirty-two member 
Constitutional Advisor Committee for examination.163  Olesen writes, “the 1964 
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constitution was an attempt to accommodate the Afghan state and to change the socio-
economic structure of the society, i.e. to provide a legal secular framework for the 
government in accordance with notions of legitimacy of power among the new middle 
class.”164 (P1 & P2)  The final version of the King’s new constitution officially turned 
Afghanistan into a modern democratic state.165   
In September 1964, a loya jirga was convened in order to consider the draft 
constitution and formally approve it.  This process, like the one that Amanullah had gone 
through in 1923, brought out the traditional forces within Afghan society that had a 
strong stake in preventing Zahir Shah from sidelining Islam all together from the Afghan 
political landscape. (P2.1)  Ewans writes that the “first text of the constitution showed a 
clear preference for a secular legal system, albeit within an overall Islamic context.”166  
In an essence, Islamic law became secondary to secular law for the first time in Afghan 
history.  Also, while Islam remained the stated religion of the nation and the Hanafi 
doctrine the official Islamic code, religious freedom was granted to all citizens.167  The 
most significant change was the basis of the legitimacy of the ruler, which was now the 
nation, not Allah or religious authority.168 (Figure 6)  However, to appease the 
traditionalists, there were still strong connections to tribal and religious notions of 
legitimacy, including the mention in the constitution that the king was still the protector 
of Islam within Afghanistan.169 (P2.1) 
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Figure 6.   Government Legitimacy Under Muhammad Zahir Shah 
(From: Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, 207) 
 
 
The fact that Afghanistan was basically turned into a secular state “was hardly 
wasted on the not insignificant number of religious leaders participating on the loya 
jirga” according to Olesen.170  In the end, the attempt to “harmonize” Islam with secular 
objectives of the constitution raised more problems than it solved.171  These objectives 
included the topics of education, women’s rights, citizenship, and the judiciary of the 
state.  In the end, unfortunately, the newly created  parliament became nothing more than 
a new forum in which old power brokers, be it the religious, tribal and rural leaders and 
the added small segment of urban elites, clashed over these controversial issues.  (P2 & 
P2.1) 
Among the educated elite and youth, the creation of the parliament brought hopes 
that political parties would eventually take center stage in politics.  However, Zahir Shah 
refused to sign any new legislation allowing the establishment of political parties.  
According to Rubin, “political parties would have both given the intellectuals a 
recognized mechanism for seeking state power and allowed the rural power holders and 
the ulema to develop national networks.”172  Because there were no established party 
systems, elections ended falling along family and religious lines, instead of ideological 
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lines.173  (P2.1)  Landowners, who came to dominate the parliament, saw themselves 
coming to Kabul as one bloc, to govern the nation collectively.174  Rubin further writes 
that these landowners “saw their position as an opportunity to use their influence to 
reduce unwanted state intrusion and to ensure that foreign aid would be spent in their 
districts under their supervision.”175   
The lack of political parties and the new liberal constitution also helped create 
new underground movements within Afghanistan, which until this point, did not exist.  
These new “movements” were all inspired by Western ideologies, like communism and 
socialism.176 (P2)  This new experiment that was intended to allow for a more democratic 
system was creating unintended consequences.  Demonstrations by students began at 
Kabul University as well as at many high schools around the city.177  Young men and 
women, looking for a political outlet, turned more and more to these newly created 
clandestine parties; now divided on two ideological lines: communism/socialism and 
Islamism.  These students, however, were not only protesting the political situation, but 
also protesting the economic situation and the lack of any future prospects of 
employment.  (P2) 
Olesen writes that this radicalization “was the most dangerous, for it polarized 
society and made militancy an option to counter the government.”178  Besides 
demonstration, open conflict began between student groups, leading to several 
fatalities.179  Many of the names that became synonymous with the Islamic movements 
of the 1980s, countering the Soviet Union, were born out of these conflicts and 
ideological groups.  “All this unrest reflected the growing division within Afghan society, 
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not just of the religious/ideological nature, but also between the successful members of 
the urban, educated middle class and those who were increasingly alienated because they 
could not aspire to their ranks, as well as between that elite and the majority, still 
cocooned in a traditional background,” writes Ewans.180  (P2.1) 
Zahir Shah had created conditions within Afghanistan where the rich landowners 
retained their power by being elected into office and the remainder of the population did 
not receive a political outlet by which to force legitimate change in government.  It was 
the same power structure that had existed in Afghanistan for hundreds of years, cloaked 
under the guise of a democracy.  The ruling class had no concept of a unified Afghanistan 
and the simple selection of political representatives clearly reflected the divisions within 
society.181 (P1)  The atmosphere in parliament was anarchic, a quorum was never 
reached, and days were filled with “fanciful speeches” that resulted in no apparent 
meaningful passage of legislation or policy.182  “The comparative liberalization during 
the parliamentary interlude of 1963-1973 displayed the pent up political effects of half a 
century’s economic, social and education policies – policies which had aggravated some 
of the existing divisions of society and created new ones, such as rural-urban dichotomy 
and a widening gap between the aspirations of the educated and the uneducated,” writes 
Olesen.183 (P1.2 & P2.1) 
With the nation becoming ever more divided and a government becoming ever 
more dysfunctional, Muhammad Daoud Khan, the former Prime Minister, who was 
removed from office by Zahir Shah in 1963, took power in a coup d’etat while Zahir 
Shah was in Rome undergoing medical treatment.  The attempt at democracy and a 
parliamentary system ended with Daoud.  Roy writes that “the experiment in democracy 
was all form and no substance and the Western democracy is only meaningful under 
certain circumstances; mainly with the identification of civil society with the state and the 
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evolution of a political entity which is something other than political theater.”184  There 
was an apparent alienation of the political class from real politics, since the system 
became dominated by the old power brokers of Afghan society.  The urban elite ended up 
combating the “democratic” parliament from which it felt it was excluded and “set up in 
opposition to two old accomplices, rural society and the tribal establishment.185 (P2.1) 
Many believe that Zahir Shah had truly good intentions in his efforts to try to 
modernize the Afghan political establishment and create a system that would be 
democratic.  He even went so far as to curtail his own power within the system and give 
the national parliament the say in running the nation in accordance to the will of the 
Afghan people.  However, Afghanistan was not ready for a drastic change in the course 
of its political development and in the end, the old political hierarchies adapted to the 
new system in order to control it and remain in power. (P2 & P2.1) The loser, in the end, 
became the Afghan people that, with Daoud, would be one step closer to civil war which 
would ravage the nation for twenty odd years. 
E. MUHAMMAD DAOUD KHAN 1973-1978 
Muhammad Daoud Khan’s coup d’etat finally ended the rule of the Durrani 
Dynasty and deposed Zahir Shah, while he was conveniently out of the country for 
medical treatments.  One of Daoud’s initial acts as the new head of state was to declare 
Afghanistan a republic and establish a presidency, which he himself would become.  He 
was quick to reach out to the Afghan people with his agenda for the new government. 
(P2) 
In his first radio address to the nation he said that “a republican system was more 
consistent with the true spirit of Islam” and promised to introduce “basic reforms aimed 
at the actualization of real democracy to serve the majority of the people as opposed to 
the ‘pseudo-democracy’ of the corrupt system, that was based on personal and class 
interest, intrigues and demagogy.”186  Initially, Daoud realized he still had to appeal to  
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the traditionalist forces within Afghanistan, until he could truly secure power, and for this 
reason he tried to persuade these forces by linking the new republican form of 
government to Islam.  (P2.1) 
For the many urban based Afghans however, this message was lost and they came 
to see the change created by Daoud’s coup d’etat as something that could possibly create 
the conditions in which true democracy could flourish.  However, there were some that 
were concerned by the fact that Daoud was brought to power with the help of leftist 
officers from the Afghan army, as well as with members of the leftist Parcham Party, led 
by Babrak Karmal.187  This leftist support alienated, right away, the members of the 
Muslim Youth Organization and Muslim Brotherhood and other like-minded Islamist 
individuals who were not sold on Daoud’s rhetoric and feared the total and complete 
separation of religion from government under his rule.188 (P2.1)  Unfortunately for the 
Islamist, their fears would be realized during the five years in which Daoud would head 
the nation. 
The coup brought two new groups into power, which so far had been excluded 
from any political influence in Afghanistan.  This was the army, which had never before 
played an active role of its own in politics, and a small group of historically urban, 
educated leftists.189  However, Daoud was not troubled by the leftist support to his 
takeover since, in his view, “communism had no appeal in Afghanistan which was a 
society based off of both the traditional and educated classes which had a stake in the 
existence of social order, while the people at large, with their adherence to tribal, Islamic 
ways, were far removed from the proletariat.”190 (P1.2 & P2.1) However, the populist 
rhetoric of the coup itself and the formulations of the new constitution in 1977 clearly 
reflected, to Afghans at all levels of society, the strong leftist influences on 
government.191 
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Once the coup finally ended and Daoud appeared to have full control over the 
state, he assumed, in addition to the presidency, the offices of Prime Minister, Foreign 
Minister and Minister of Defense.192 (P2)  This allowed him to deal directly within 
society, as well as in the international community.  This was especially important in 
regards to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan’s economy since by the time he had seized 
power in 1973, Afghanistan had already become a rentier state with 40% of state 
revenues coming from abroad, mainly from the Soviet Union.193  From 1956 to 1978, the 
Soviet Union had supplied Afghanistan with approximately 2.5 billion dollars worth of 
economic and military aid while the United States only supplied 533 million worth of 
aid.194  This Russian support helped Daoud improve, at the outset of his rule, the Afghan 
economy and even achieve a small balance of payments surplus. 195  However, this 
external revenue also relieved Daoud of whatever incentives he might have had to make 
his government accountable to the people.196 (P2) This lack of accountability and 
perceived dependence on an external force to help sustain the nation economically 
brought about feelings of humiliation among the traditionalist and rural Afghans and 
created the feelings that Daoud was becoming increasingly more of a puppet to the 
Soviets and of the leftist elite in Kabul.   
On the reform front, Daoud promised new land reforms and nationalized all 
Afghan natural resources, economic sectors and big industry; also all businesses were to 
be regulated with the goal of eliminating exploitation.197  He intended to create 
conditions where all economic classes would be protected by government regulation, but 
in doing so, for the first time in Afghan history, there was acknowledgement of class 
divisions, creating another level of fracture in the already highly fragmented Afghan 
society. (P1.1, P1.2 & P2.1)  Land reform was meant to make land more accessible to the 
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rural populations so they could break away from the old feudal system and own the 
property upon which they worked.  However, since many areas were considered as being 
owned by the entire tribe and its members or simply by the strong warlord or khan, this 
system was not feasible and only created more anger towards the central government 
from the countryside. 
Beginning to realize that his association with the leftists was causing great 
consternation among the greater population, Daoud began the process of distancing 
himself from these forces. (P2)  In 1975, he began a purge within the Afghan army to rid 
it of many Marxist and leftist thinking officers, and at the same time many young leftists 
were sent to remote tribal wilderness areas as administrators as a form of exile.198  
During the same time period, Daoud also clamped down on “Islamist religious groups, 
which increasingly were showing subversive tendencies” writes Ewans.199  The cause of 
this “subversion” on the part of the Islamist was the objection to the degree of Daoud’s 
involvement with the Soviet Union.200  (P2.1)  In addition, the Islamists felt that they had 
lost the freedoms they had enjoyed under Zahir Shah’s regime and saw the unbalanced 
approached that was being taken in regards to the freedoms allotted to the leftist and 
socialist groups of the time.201  Daoud was quick to begin eliminating members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, as well as having large numbers of the Islamist jailed without a 
clear judicial reason.  The eventual fallout of Daoud’s actions against the Islamists would 
result in the popularization of Afghans such as Ahmad Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin 
Hekmetyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Abd-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf.  All four men would 
become key personalities as leaders of military groups countering the Soviet and 
Communist Afghan forces during the 1980s and become involved in a long civil war to 
try to gain control of the Afghan state. 
However, in the near term, this clamp down and unjustified imprisonments caused 
a revolt and uprising in the Panjsher Valley, which was led by Ahmad Shah Massoud.  
These Islamists were able to capture one district and two sub-districts headquarters but                                                  
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had to retreat within 24 hours in the face of the Afghan army and a hostile population.202  
This revolt began to show the cracks that were forming within Afghanistan as lines were 
being drawn; one side with Afghans supporting the central government that was left 
leaning and on the other, the traditionalist/Islamist groups, trying to counter this new 
government which they saw as anti-religious and externally manipulated. (P2.1) For the 
time being, however, Daoud, with his army, won this battle in the Panjshir and the 
remaining free Islamist leaders were forced to flee to Pakistan.  There they began creating 
political/military groups to counter the Daoud government, both on the battlefield as well 
as in the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. 
At the same time as Daoud was trying to control the leftists and drive the Islamist 
forces out of Afghanistan, there was a growing concern among the educated elite of 
Kabul that the political promises of a more democratic state were not coming to fruition.  
(P2)  No parliament was created from the time Daoud took control of the government to 
1977.203  Also, since there was no judiciary arm of the government, because the Ministry 
of Justice had been merged with the executive, all judging powers were therefore placed 
in the hands of Daoud, allowing him to come down hard on any dissenting segments of 
society or individuals.204  Daoud, however, did realize that he needed to take steps to 
create a basic framework of government under a constitution in order to try to regain 
some legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan educated elite, as well as create a strong 
centralized system around himself in order to maintain his power within the state. 
The first step he took was the creation his own political party, the Hezbi Inqilab-i-
Melli (National Revolutionary Party).205  In 1977 a loya jirga was convened in order 
approve a new constitution, which was drafted by Daoud.  There was little resistance 
from the members of the loya jirga in regards to Daoud’s constitution and they ratified it 
and elected Daoud as the new president for a six year term.206  In short, with this new 
constitution and the way in which Daoud was ruling Afghanistan, the nation did not 
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become a democracy, but instead, turned into a state run by autocratic rule that was 
highly centralized with an extremely strong presidency.207 (P2)  What made this process 
more insulting to the Afghans was that the loya jirga, that set these political changes in 
motion, was composed largely of  presidential nominees and representatives of the armed 
forces, as well as Daoud’s National Revolutionary Party members.208  In addition, all the 
candidates for the new parliament would be nominated by the members of the National 
Revolutionary Party.  As far as the traditionalists and rural power brokers were 
concerned, this totally alienated them from the government and cut off any chances for 
them to gain access to political channels to try to influence the government.209 (P2.1) 
The constitution itself contained many ideas and concepts that were viewed as 
socialist and revolutionary and called for economic and social reform, as well as the 
elimination of exploitation of individuals and more aggressive land reforms and 
nationalization.  The constitution was seen as extremely progressive with the addition of 
these concepts.210  In the end though, as the Afghan people found out, the call for social 
justice, civil rights, and a parliamentary democracy were all nothing more than empty 
concepts, allowing Daoud greater power to control all aspects of their lives.  
Compounding this problem was the slow alienation of the leftist support, which Daoud 
had enjoyed for a brief period of time, because his government did not follow through 
with the promised reforms.211  In the end, this whole process only accomplished one 
thing; it formalized what was already in existence: an extremely autocratic, centralized 
and repressive regime, which drew its strength from the armed forces and the 
bureaucracy.212  This system was bound for failure and in 1978 it came crashing down 
around Daoud.  He was finally removed from office, with Soviet help, in a counter coup 
by leftist forces which opened the door for greater direct Soviet influence on domestic 
and international politics of Afghanistan.   
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“When Daoud assumed the presidency in 1973, he cast aside more than two 
centuries of steadily growing legitimacy for the monarchy and replaced it with a 
republican system that has struggled for acceptance since then and has, in periodic 
moments of desperation, explored reestablishing some form of monarchy to assure 
unity,” writes Mangus and Naby.213  Daoud had done little to transform the mode of 
governing to match the means in which he had taken power.214  During the five years that 
he was president, no positive social, economic, or political change was seen by the 
Afghans.  In addition, even with land reforms the living conditions of the rural population 
did not improve as promised.215  What also convulsed the Afghan population in rural 
areas were the heavy doses of Marxist propaganda combined with abrupt, confused and 
arbitrary attempts of the newly posted, inexperienced officials to impose the new 
government reforms.216 (P2.1) 
 Initially, Daoud brought with him the prospects of creating a truly democratic 
Afghanistan for its people and promised to right the wrongs of the past.  However, not 
only did he create more fragmentation in the state, a fragmentation that was new and 
along class and ideological lines, but he also alienated factions that were his own power 
base, the leftists.  The conditions that Daoud created in Afghanistan from 1973 to the 
present have “haunted all Kabul regimes since the end of the monarchy and their lack of 
creating the specter of legitimacy of the internal government,” writes Magnus and 
Naby.217 (P2 & P2.1) 
F. PROPOSITION ANALYSIS WITH REGARDS TO CASE STUDIES 
Thus far, as the relevance of each proposition has become apparent, it has been 
annotated to show the reader the corresponding idea and correlation within the historical 
context of the research.  This process has helped demonstrate the trends that exist in 
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Afghanistan in relation to the ideas within the propositions and have also helped 
demonstrate whether or not any one single proposition had validity.  To help present 
these findings, a graphic representation has been created as Figure 7: Proposition Validity 
in Relation to Individual Regime.   
 
Figure 7.   Proposition Validity in Relation to Individual Regimes 
 
 This figure helps demonstrate the sheer difficulty any single regime has had so far 
in overcoming ethnic fragmentation, tribalism and religious ideas as a counter to 
government legitimacy and overall authority.  This has been true regardless of the type of 
government that has been presented to the Afghan people; from monarchies to 
socialist/communist based systems.  In addition, the lack of support for the central 
government has hampered the development of democratic institutions and basic 
governmental infrastructure for democracy.  Interestingly this research has also 
demonstrated that no Afghan government, thus far, has been able to successfully create a 
lasting national Afghan identity which would help pave the way for democratic 
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development.  When Afghan rulers have had success in creating a unified front on a 
national level, they have been short lived and situational dependent, the most prevalent 
example being the rally around Amanullah Khan after his successful declaration of 
independence from British dominance early in his rein.   
 This graphic most importantly demonstrates that Afghans have not been able to 
forge ahead passed their ethnic differences and arrive at a stage in political development 
that would allow for the consideration of a national identity.  Afghans have been stuck in 
the debate of government authority and legitimacy in the face of issues such as ethnicity 
and religion, which has prevented them from taking the proper steps to begin debating 
democracy and its development within Afghanistan.  The lack of data, nearly across the 
board under proposition 1, only proves this point.  Unless Afghans come to terms with 
government authority or are presented with an option that they see as a legitimate form of 
government, the conditions for democratic debate and development will never occur.  
Once the conditions within propositions 2 and 2.1 are resolved, Afghans and their 
government will be ready to consider and debate the ideas presented in propositions 1, 
1.1 and 1.2.  Keeping these findings in mind, the current government will now be 
analyzed and will be subject to the same test that the case studies have just undergone.  
G. HAMID KARZAI 2001-PRESENT 
The fall of the Taliban regime in early December 2001 helped create the 
conditions, for the first time in over twenty years of Afghan history, for the formation of 
a stable and democratic government that would allow participation of all ethnicities in the 
governing process.  On December 5, 2001, in Bonn, Germany, an agreement was reached 
by members of different non-Taliban Afghan factions, factions that had ironically 
opposed each other through years of civil war, which helped set in motion the creation of 
a new Afghan Interim Administration that would rule over the state until national 
elections could be held.  The Northern Alliance, consisting of mainly Tajik members, was 
granted prominent positions within this new Interim Administration, such as the 
ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, while the presidency was given to 
Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, whose appointment, according to Dorronsoro, “was intended 
by the negotiators to endow the Interim Administration with legitimacy in Pashtun 
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eyes.”218 (P2 & P2.1)  However, this dominance of the Northern Alliance in the key 
areas of government helped create the first cleavages between Afghan power brokers in 
contemporary times; mainly that of the Panjshiris Tajiks, General Dostam (an Uzbek), 
Ismail Khan (a Tajik), and Abd-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf (a Pashtun).   
The Bonn Agreement shaped the basic framework for the transformation of the 
Afghan political system, however, it was “extraordinarily ambitious in scope and it 
provided little detail on how it’s most essential aspects could or should be 
accomplished.”219   In short, this agreement spelled out the powers of the Interim 
Administration and then that of the Transitional Administration, which was intended to 
take the lead in reconstructing Afghanistan, helping unify all current Afghan militia 
forces under the power of the central government.  The agreement made the provision 
that an emergency loya jirga was to be held within six months from the formation of the 
Interim Administration to elect the new Transitional Administration.  In addition, a new 
constitution had to be drafted within eighteen months of the creation of this Transitional 
Administration to be ratified by a constitutional loya jirga.  The timetables were set in 
motion on December 22, 2001, once the Interim Administration was officially in office.  
As for a constitution, until a new one could be drafted, the 1964 version was to be used 
throughout the nation.  However, the portions of the 1964 constitution dealing with the 
executive and legislative branches were excluded from use, eliminating the most 
meaningful provisions of that document.220 (P2) The wheels of government were now set 
in motion and the process of demilitarizing the militias and paving the way for the 
emergency loya jirga had begun.   
In the days leading up to the emergency loya jirga, the former Afghan King, Zahir 
Shah, was considered, by many that would attend, the most viable candidate to lead the 
nation.  In addition, the position of some of the delegates was in favor of also excluding 
the many former “commanders” from this process, commanders that were seen as power 
hungry warlords looking to benefit from the new government and were currently holding 
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high positions within the Interim Administration.221  As Dorronsoro writes, the “crucial 
decisions, in particular the choice of Hamid Karzai as the new president, had already 
been taken by the United States, at whose behest Zahir Shah was obliged to step 
aside.”222  The American Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad held a press conference, a day 
before the emergency loya jirga, to announce the king’s decision to step aside from 
consideration and hold only a ceremonial position, which in turn produced significant 
Pashtun discontent.223   
This situation helped start off the emergency loya jirga with feelings of suspicion, 
and in the future, would bring into question Karzai’s legitimacy among many Pashtuns 
that still held strong loyalties to their former king. (P2)  There was also anger among the 
attendees in the way in which the United States had been seen as dictating who would be 
the Transitional Authority President.  With all of these issues present however, the 
emergency loya jirga did have its successes by simply bringing delegates from around 
the nation to one location and creating a forum for peaceful discussion of the future of the 
state.  On the other hand, the emergency loya jirga failed in three key areas, mainly 
concerning its inability to assert the power of civilian leadership, its inability in 
promoting democratic expression, and its inability in reducing the power base of the 
warlords.224 (P1.2 & P2)  At the time, many delegates were concerned with the short 
term goals of the state and creating institutions that would promote security within 
Afghanistan rather than attacking the old traditional power structures that had existed for 
many years. (P2.1)  By not curtailing the influence of the strong warlords, President 
Karzai would find himself in a difficult situation of attempting to rein in their power, and 
would eventually turn to the United States for help. (P2.1)  Historically, Afghan rulers 
that have turned to outside forces to help control domestic issues have not fared well and 
have lost some legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. (P2) 
What was left after the emergency loya jirga was a timetable that was intended to 
being the process of democratizing Afghanistan.  Under the surface though, what was                                                  
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created was a Transitional Administration, followed by an elected government that had 
no true political or legitimate power outside of Kabul.225 (P2)  The distribution of 
political power in the provinces was really along the old tribal and ethnic lines based on  
hierarchical relationships. (P1.2 & P2.1)  Examples are as follows: in the south and east, 
fragmentation began to appear due to mounting security issues, forcing Afghans to ally 
themselves with strong rural warlords or within tribal structures that had historically 
provided protection against aggression, and the re-emergence of opium production began  
weakening any political and judicial authority that the central government had in these 
areas.226 (P1, P1.1, & P1.2)  In Kandahar, for example, three strong warlords were vying 
for political power, independent of the Karzai government.  They were Gul Agha Shirzai, 
who would eventually be appointed as governor of Kandahar Province by Karzai simply 
because of his large support base, Naqibullah, a former Northern Alliance commander, 
and Karzai’s own brother, Wali Karzai.  This same scenario repeated itself throughout the 
country.  In the north of Afghanistan, the former parties of the Northern Alliance were 
quick to fill the void left by the Karzai regime, even though many of these parties were 
under the control of high ranking members of Karzai’s own government.  (P2 & P2.1) 
Further undermining the Karzai government, in addition to its inability to exercise 
control over the entirety of the state, was the highly splintered nature of the government 
itself.  Many former enemies, due to their ethnicity and religion, were within the close 
circles of Karzai and in 2002, this showed itself with the many attempts from within to 
subvert the government.227 (P1.2, P2 & P2.1) This time period saw assassinations, 
political in nature, occurring all around President Karzai.  For example, there was the 
assassination of the Minister of Civil Aviation, Abdul Rahman, in February 2002 while 
he was preparing to board a flight at Kabul International Airport.  Karzai himself was not 
spared attempts on his life during the same time period.  There was a deep suspicion, 
within the Afghan government and state, that many of these attempts were politically 
motivated from factions within the government trying to send a message to President 
Karzai and the United States. These messages simply were the dissatisfaction many felt 
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with the closeness of Karzai and the United States.  In the meantime, the Afghan people 
were left on the sidelines, watching this entire process through great skepticism of the 
government and democratic development.   
Combined with the stresses of ethnic fragmentation, economics also became a 
growing concerning for the Transitional Administration.  Until this point in time, all 
Afghan government assets had been frozen due to the embargo that was placed on the 
Taliban regime, in addition the destroyed national infrastructure made it difficult to “kick 
start” the economic engine of the state.  Karzai’s government became extremely 
dependent on international economic aid and loans.  The 4.4 billion dollars promised at 
the Tokyo Conference in 2002 did little to help this process, since the Afghan 
government only received approximately sixteen percent of the aid directly.228  In 
addition, the international politics of the time, including American preparations for a war 
in Iraq, were refocusing the global community elsewhere, which affected the flow of aid 
into Afghanistan’s reconstruction and economic programs.  The Transitional 
Administration was increasingly being criticized by Afghans for its inability to maintain 
the focus of the international aid agencies in helping to rebuild Afghanistan and its 
inability to produce the promised economic relief.  Compounding the problem was the 
government’s own inability to mobilize its own domestic resources to deal with this 
problem.229 (P2) 
The disarray in which Afghanistan was left made it almost impossible to create 
institutions for a tax collection process.  Not until early 2004 was Karzai able to force 
local governors to turn over tax revenues and customs duties to the central government.  
Many provinces had begun flourishing under their own system, without support from the 
center, due to the taxation on trade and goods and services.  The prime example was 
Herat Province, under Ismail Khan, which was able create a small economic boom based 
on trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In fact, the city of Herat boasted greater 
development than the capital Kabul, including paved roads and electricity.  These 
occurrences helped strengthen the ties of Afghans to local leaders, rather than to the 
central government, which had always been seen as far away, uncaring and unable to 
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provide for the population.  The National Reconstruction Plan, which was proposed by 
Karzai, moved at an extremely slow pace and was hampered by his lack of credibility 
outside of Kabul and the “difficulty of organizing citizen participation in a new 
democratic process after years of restrictive Taliban rule.”230 
The Karzai government did have success, however, in dealing with certain power 
brokers in different regions of the state.  These power brokers saw, for the time, a benefit 
in recognizing the central government and the international aid that it could divvy out to 
their regions.  Widespread corruption had to be overcome, though, to free as much 
funding as possible for all regions in order for reconstruction to begin.  Realizing that the 
central government needed to get ahead of these problems, in 2003 Karzai’s Interior 
Minister of the time, Ali Ahmad Jalali, moved to replace governors in certain 
provinces.231 (P2)  These moves were against governors of smaller provinces that did not 
have as strong a military or political power base, unlike governors like Ismail Khan, in 
Herat.  This was a small, but crucial step in exerting the central government’s authority 
throughout Afghanistan. (P2 & P2.1) The goal would eventually be to remove all of 
these old power brokers from the areas under their influence and place them in positions 
close to the central government, like key ministries, followed by the appointment of 
governors loyal to the center to replace them.   
Following along this theme and the guidelines set forth in the emergency loya 
jirga, the consolidation of militia forces was begun in order to place them under the direct 
control of the central Afghan government. (P2) Dorronsoro writes that “the Ministry of 
Defense was viewed as the fief of the Panjhiris, who almost entirely made up the garrison 
in Kabul and for that reason were not able to present themselves as the credible nucleus 
of a national army.”232  Compounding the problem of creating a national army has been 
the lack of funds and the unwillingness of many warlords and militia leaders to turn over 
their forces and heavy weapons to Kabul for full control by the central government. (P2)  
The highly hierarchical structure of Afghan society makes this process even more 
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challenging, because many militias are composed of entire villages loyal to their khans 
alone or are made up of certain ethnic groups that have historic hostilities, not only to 
other ethnic groups, but also to rival clans within their own tribes. (P2.1) This process 
proved that “the drive to reconstruct the state clashed with the efforts of the regional 
powers to remain autonomous” from the center.233 (P1.2 & P2.1) 
On a political note, this new government, under the leadership of Karzai, has 
created more fragmentation within Afghanistan by creating conditions in which different 
ethnic groups have aligned themselves behind the strong warlords or political leaders that 
represent only their ethnicity.  Examples include the Uzbeks standing behind General 
Dostam and the Hazaras allying behind Khalili during elections or in disputes within 
government.  The interesting phenomenon has been the role of Pashtuns in this overall 
process.  Since the members of the former Northern Alliance have dominated politics in 
Afghanistan in recent years, the Pashtuns, the traditional power brokers in Afghan 
politics, have not been able to find a true outlet in the political realm.  President Karzai 
has not gained much credibility due to the perception of his government being propped 
up by the United States and his lack of any military credentials in the face of the Soviets 
during the war in the 1980s.  In addition, the many Pashtun within the government today 
are simply viewed as technocrats that owe their jobs to the presence of international 
forces within Afghanistan, and have no credibility among the Pashtuns, especially those 
that stayed in Afghanistan and suffered through the Soviet invasion and Taliban rule. 
On the religious front, the Afghan ulema have not been as prevalent in matters of 
government as they had been in past regimes.  This could be attributed to the fallout from 
the Taliban regime and the antagonistic feelings of many within the Afghan government 
towards the repressive policies, however as un-Islamic as they were, that had been 
implemented during their rule of Afghanistan.  “On the other hand, their exclusion from 
politics has enabled them to resume their earlier position as critics of the government.”234  
(P2.1)  In addition, the ulema have stepped in to fill the void left vacant due to the lack of 
trained individuals in rural areas by providing educational and juridical services.   
President Karzai’s lack of any religious educational background  and his strong ties to the 
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United States have also left him open for criticism, not only from the ulema, but also 
from regional power brokers that not only base their legitimacy on their relationships 
with their constituents, but also on their “pious” Islamic lifestyles and personas, Ismail 
Khan being a primary example.   
The Karzai government has also been criticized among traditionalists for its open 
policies towards women and their growing role in not only Afghan society, but also in the 
political landscape of the state. (P2.1) Women have been allowed greater freedoms than 
ever before under the new regime and have even been mandated, by law, to make up a 
certain segment of the Afghan legislature.  However, many women still remain under 
strong male influences in rural areas and not much has been accomplished by the central 
government to extend these new rights to the outlying regions. (P2.1)  Even today, many 
Afghan women in Kabul, don the veil as they go about their day to day business in and 
around the city.  The Karzai government has tried to play a delicate balancing act 
between international pressure forcing for more women’s right through aid stipulations 
while taking into consideration the nature of Afghan society and its views on women and 
their place within society.  (P2) 
The considerable presence of not only American forces, but also international 
militaries in Afghanistan has been a blessing and a curse to the Karzai regime.  First, the 
continued efforts of the United States to search and destroy Al Qaeda and Taliban forces 
has led to many incidents that have resulted in wrongful targeting as well as direct 
intrusion into rural areas, drawing great anger among the local populations.  On the other 
hand, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), established in various parts of 
Afghanistan by Coalition Forces, has helped with the transition of militia forces into the 
regular army as well as helped with economic projects in revitalizing these areas.  The 
inability, however, of the Afghan government to conduct these projects on its own with 
strictly Afghan military forces has directed criticism at Karzai and his government.  Seen 
as allowing for the free moment and unrestricted operations of Coalition Forces, 
President Karzai has gained the reputation as a “yes man” and is seen as not much 
different from the Afghan presidents of the 1980s, who in a sense, had the same 
relationship with Soviet Union and its military forces in Afghanistan.  
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Currently, the Afghan government is continuing the process set forth in the Bonn 
Agreement.  The recent elections were deemed a success by the government, however, 
reports by United Nations observers of highly questionable balloting and allegations of 
fraud have cast a dark shadow over the process.  The Karzai government has, since 
coming to power, been able to maintain a delicate peace within Afghanistan, peace that is 
only accomplished by the willingness of certain warlords and power brokers to adhere 
with the current process.  No one can truly estimate how long this cooperation will last, 
since these past elections have shown how Afghans still voted strictly on ethnic lines and 
Karzai’s attempted manipulation, in the form of not allowing political parties to 
participate, caused great consternation among the population.   
The continued American and foreign military presence is likely to slowly wear on 
the Afghans, who historically, have been very antagonistic against any perceived foreign 
occupation of any sort.  The lack of economic success, compounded with the slow 
progress of reconstruction, has also damaged President Karzai’s government, who is seen 
as unable to deliver the promises of the past few years. (P2) The slow transformation of 
the military and added antagonism between historical military and political rivals within 
the government presents a picture to Afghans of a regime that has no solid footing or 
base, and in the end, their future might be more secure in the hands of their local power 
brokers. (P1.2 & P2.1) The Karzai government is a difficult case study since it still is 
developing and has, politically, significant more time left in office; however, with the 
many policies and outcomes thus far, it has shown that the lessons of previous failed 
regimes have not been fully digested and evaluated, causing deep concern for the current 
government and Afghanistan’s political future. 
H. PROPOSITION ANALYSIS WITH REGARDS TO THE KARZAI 
GOVERNMENT 
Figure 8: Proposition Validity in Relation to the Current Government, 
demonstrates the relevance of each idea represented within the propositions of this thesis 
in regards to the current government and the issues that it is facing today.  This graphic is 
displayed on the next page. 
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So far, the Karzai government has been plagued by many of the same issues that 
were faced by previous regimes within the case studies.  First and foremost, the 
challenges of overcoming ethnic fragmentation, tribalism and religious ideas as a counter 
to government legitimacy and overall authority have not been accomplished by this 
government.  In addition, the widespread participation of non-Pashtuns in every level of 
government has, in some cases, increased ethnic tensions within Afghanistan and has 
created further fragmentation and animosity throughout society.  In short, questions of 
legitimacy and authority need to be dealt with before Afghans will become ready to 
accept democratic debate and openly try to overcome ethnic differences.  These finds 
demonstrate Afghans have a need to feel their government is securing their interest and 
conforms within the boundaries of their cultural and ethnic mores.  This begs the 
question; can democracy in the western sense ever be acceptable to Afghans who hold 
strong to their local ethnic and tribal codes and cultural beliefs?  Afghans and the world, 
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as a whole, will have to wait for the answer to this question as Hamid Karzai continues to 
lead his country through this political labyrinth.   
I. SUMMARY 
Beginning with Amir Habibullah to the present day head of state, Hamid Karzai, 
we can see the impact and the effects that Afghan society and Islam have had on the 
success and failure of each regime.  Afghans are extremely loyal to traditional rules of 
governing and incorporate Islam into this notion by attributing a ruler’s legitimacy 
through religion and tribal politics. (P2.1) This lesson was not learned thoroughly by 
twentieth century Afghan rulers who continuously repeated the same mistakes their 
predecessors had committed time and time again.  Amir Habibullah allied himself too 
closely with a foreign power (the British), a power that was seen as an aggressor by his 
people in the early 1900s.  By not jumping on the “jihad bandwagon” and supporting the 
Turkish Caliph during World War I, Amir Habibullah lost his Islamic credentials in the 
eyes of the Afghan people and was overthrown. (P2.1)  Without the support of the ulema 
and traditionalist Afghans, the ruler had to rely increasingly on his own tribal affiliations 
to maintain power, which in itself helped antagonize the remainder of the Pashtuns and 
non-Pashtun power brokers that were able to form a non-traditional coalition to counter 
the government. (P1.2, P2 & P2.1) 
Amanullah Khan, with his progressive modernization efforts, created conditions 
in which many Afghans found themselves facing modernity, while increasingly, their 
government was encroaching on their traditional way of life.  Hot button issues, such as 
women’s rights, education, and civil reforms fell contrary to the belief systems of the 
rural population and were forced upon them at an extremely high pace.  Amanullah also 
never truly embraced the notion of the legitimacy of the ruler being forged from Islam 
and placed himself in positions opposite that of the Afghan ulema and traditionalist 
classes. (P2.1)  Amanullah’s reforms could have succeeded if he had more patience and 
conducted them in a more gradual pace, which would have been more acceptable to the 
Afghans as a whole.  By adopting Mustafa Kemal’s vision of how a state should look, 
Amanullah sealed his own fate, for Afghanistan was not nearly as cohesive a national 
entity as Turkey was at the end of World War I, ready to embrace modernity on such a 
grand scale. (P1, P1.1, P1.2, P2 & P2.1) 
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Nadir Shah neither acted decisively or in a fashion that was adequate to keep pace 
with the reforms and changes in government he tried to implement.  By producing a new 
constitution, but not allowing for a legal form of a political outlet for the Afghans, he 
helped create underground networks based on political ideologies hostile to his 
government. (P2)  If true democratic change was intended by Nadir Shah, there had to be 
more participation by the common Afghan, rather than having a system where old power 
brokers, now repackaged, continued dominating the government at all levels. (P2.1) In 
addition, the lack of a strong military that would be loyal to the government and was able 
to overcome ethnic barriers from within hampered any chance Nadir Shah had at success. 
(P1.1)  Afghans loved their king, but Afghan history also that Afghans had a love of 
strong and heroic leaders, which Nadir Shah was never able to become. 
Muhammad Daoud tried to use new concepts, Western concepts, in order to 
change Afghanistan into what he believed would be a modern and viable state in the 
international political community.  However, his reliance on specific factions within 
society to help him take power and his courting of a single external superpower for 
economic and military relief left him, in much the same way as Habibullah, dealing with 
an increasing reputation as an international weak leader. (P2 & P2.1) To counter the 
growing dissent, Daoud was able to create a strong military and security apparatus, 
turning Afghanistan into an autocratic state which conducted extremely repressive 
policies to control the population.  In addition, his progressive reform policies, with a 
leftist hue, countered traditional Afghan notions of landownership as well as relationship 
with the center. (P2.1)  Forcing strong change from the center, as Amanullah had tried at 
one time, only ended with disaster for Daoud who was overthrown by even more extreme 
leftist leaning Afghans, leading to the almost two decades of civil war and strife. 
Hamid Karzai, the current president and ethnic Pashtun, is under tremendous 
pressure while attempting to rule over a government and nation that seems extremely 
fragile due to ethnic and historical differences. (P1.2 & P2.1)  Afghanistan’s current 
challenges are great, from the social, economic, and political standpoint.  Karzai will 
have to implement modern reforms and try to rebuild the Afghan state without coming 
into conflict with traditional ideas and power structures, a feat that has proved to be 
extremely difficult over the last one hundred years. (P2 & P2.1)  The legitimacy of the 
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Afghan government will continue to come into question as long as it is seen as being 
propped up by the coalition of foreign powers and as more issues arise in the political 
process, be it alleged election fraud or legislative quarrel.   The prospects for a cohesive 
and successful Afghan state being governed through recognizable democratic institutions 
and systems of government, at this point, seem bleak.  President Karzai, for the 
foreseeable future, will continue to face the almost insurmountable task of bringing 
democracy to an ever more fragmented Afghanistan and continues to face threats, not 



















V. CONCLUSION  
A. INTODUCTION 
This chapter is designed to examine the effects a failed or successful Afghan 
experiment in state formation and democracy would have on Southwest Asia and the 
United States.  It is extremely important to discuss this issue as it has far reaching effects, 
not only for the region, but also in regards to American foreign policy and the effort of 
the United States in spreading democratic ideals throughout the region.  In short, 
Afghanistan’s neighbors will be at a loss from a failed Afghan attempt in democratic state 
development due to the potential of continued ethnic infighting and political instability 
that may spread throughout the region. 
In addition, this chapter will present a general conclusion for this thesis, added 
with possible recommendations for the success of Afghanistan as it attempts to overcome 
ethnic fragmentation, restrictive tribal structures and religious notions of governing to 
form a strong and cohesive government based on democratic ideals.  The current Afghan 
endeavor in this regard will have far reaching effects on current theories of state 
formation and ethnic fragmentation.  In the end, a basic proposal will be presented on 
whether or not Afghanistan, facing today’s societal environment, has the proper 
conditions to accomplish the stated goals and foster the birth of a national identity and a 
long lasting stable government. 
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE AFGHAN 
GOVERNMENT ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE REGION 
1. Introduction 
The success or failure of Afghanistan in creating a Western style democratic 
government, with recognizable and well-defined political institutions, will have a great 
impact on, not only the United States and its stated policies for the region, but also a great 
impact on Afghanistan’s neighbors.  Currently, the region as a whole is facing numerous 
challenges that threaten to force many actors (on the state, organizational, and individual 
levels) into conflict with one another over a varying degree of issues.  These are issues 
ranging from weapons proliferation to drug trafficking to the creation of new 
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transportation corridors that will be able to link new markets forming in Central Asia 
with the remainder of the global trading community for the first time in history.   
A successful Afghan government that is able to embrace democratic ideals and 
govern legitimately can become a shining example, to not only its neighbors to the north, 
the Central Asian Republics, but also to states like Iran, Pakistan, and even possibly 
China and Iraq.  A well-formed and functioning democratic Afghan government can help 
stabilize the region and allow for the development of strong ties between regional actors 
and power brokers by possibly becoming the “middleman” state.  Finally, the success of 
Afghanistan would help legitimize American foreign policy goals of spreading 
democratic ideals throughout the region and strengthen the position of the United States, 
by allowing for greater leverage in the future when dealing with actors in this region. 
On the other hand, a failed Afghan state, with the added ingredient of American 
involvement, can create a dangerous scenario for Afghanistan’s neighbors and the region.  
As the 1990s have demonstrated, an Afghanistan which falls into chaos and lawlessness 
creates the conditions that are potentially negative to the region and eventually can 
generate problems that can directly involve the international community, both on the 
political and military fronts, and can upset the delicate balance of power between regional 
actors.  A failed Afghan government means an increased chance for the re-birth of 
institutions and organizations with fundamentalist approaches to religious and political 
ideas; a threat that is not lost on Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially the fragile Central 
Asian Republics.  Today, Afghanistan is combating an ever growing drug trafficking 
problem which could grow to new heights without any centralized controlling authority 
within the state.  Finally, a failed Afghan government would mean the end of any chance 
of opening up trade routes from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, as was attempted 
during the chaotic rule of the Taliban in the 1990s.   
As a whole, many different regional actors will be directly affected if Afghanistan 
is not able to succeed in forming a stable and long lasting government.  These regional 
actors include China, Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia, and the United States. Whatever 
happens in regards to Afghanistan, these actors benefit to win or lose; however, in the 
end, a strong and lasting Afghan government is the best solution for the concerns of each 
individual state actor. 
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2. China 
Of all the regional actors in Southwest Asia, China has the least in shared 
historical commonality with Afghanistan in regards to both politics and ethnicity.  China 
will not benefit from a failed Afghan state or an Afghanistan that might revert back into 
civil war.  Peimani writes that “what has created a stake for the Chinese in Afghanistan 
has been its potential to become a source of a threat to their stability and national 
security.”235  These threats can be defined as a fear that Afghanistan would turn into a 
hostile territory from which anti-Chinese government groups could launch military and 
political attacks on the regime and second, political developments in Afghanistan, by 
themselves, could have a negative effect on China’s own internal stability.236  An 
Afghanistan that is not able to establish control within its borders and territory, as was the 
case during the civil war years and during the rule of the Taliban, can help create the 
political vacuum in which there is a potential for the creation of safe havens for 
organizations that can become a direct threat to China and its rule of its western 
provinces; provinces which have a substantial amount of Muslims living within their 
boundaries.  For years, China has had a strong concern in the export of fundamentalism 
and political extremism to these areas from outside the state.  Simply put, China must 
ensure that Afghanistan will not become a hostile territory housing anti-Chinese 
government groups, today and in the future.237   
Like many other regional actors, China is currently progressing towards creating a 
large economic empire for itself that can globally compete with states like the United 
States and Japan, while at the same time trying to implement new political reforms that 
would allow for the economic boom that is occurring domestically.  For this reason, 
“China would wish to avoid Afghanistan becoming a military threat because China 
requires a long period of time of peace to continue to the process of economic and social 
transformation.”238  An Afghanistan that might become a failed state creates a great 
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hurdle that China must pass while trying to gain access to Central Asian oil and gas 
fields, as well as access to the natural resources of the Middle East.   
Finally, if Afghanistan is unable to create the conditions in which the United 
States is willing to remove all of its military assets, this continued American presence in 
the region will become viewed as a direct threat to China.  China is concerned about 
Afghanistan turning into a hostile territory where regional and non- regional powers 
could establish permanent military bases capable of endangering its national security.239  
A prolonged American presence due to an unstable Afghan government or a failed 
Afghan state becomes worrisome for China as it tries to expand its own influence in the 
region; especially in Central Asia.  China has much to lose if Afghanistan is unable to 
accomplish its stated goals at the current time.  A successful Afghan government would 
mean stability in the region, a denial of safe havens for China’s perceived enemies, and 
the reduction the American military presence that is able to threaten China’s goals of 
becoming the dominant military and economic power in the region.  For these reasons, 
the implications of failure in Afghanistan are detrimental to China’s internal stability and 
national security policy.  
3. Iran 
Unlike China, Iran shares a very strong historical bond with Afghanistan, which 
was literally a part of its empire until about four hundred years ago.  Compounding the 
bond between both states is the sheer number of Afghan refugees who have sought refuge 
in Iran during the Soviet occupation and the ensuing civil war during the early part of the 
1990s.  At one point, over two million Afghans crossed into Iran to escape the fighting 
back in their provinces.  These factors have created strong ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
tie between both nations.240  In addition, Iran’s key interest in Afghanistan is to exert its 
own influence over the western part of that nation and to protect the Shia minority groups 
that live within the central region of Afghanistan.241  According to Peimani, the 
possibility of “instability, chaos, and criminal activities in Afghanistan could spill over 
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into Iran which, unsurprisingly has caused the Iranian government to watch their Afghan 
neighbors closely and has caused concern about the pace of events within Afghanistan 
with the potential of inducing instability into Iran.”242   
The main concern for the Iranians has been the growing effects of the 
international drug-trafficking organizations.  Even after the fall of the Taliban and the 
creation of the current Afghan government, the production and export of narcotics 
remained one of the most critical problems for Afghanistan’s neighbors.243  For the 
Afghan people however, the production and sale of narcotics has been a key financial 
resource for economic prosperity.  “Drug-trafficker’s efforts to cross the Iranian border 
and their constant fighting with Iranian border troops and law enforcement forces has 
resulted in significant losses in human lives and has caused a heavy financial burden on 
Iran’s economy.”244   
This problem of drug-trafficking not only has negative effects on Iran’s growing 
issues with drug dependency, but has also paved the way for the establishment of under- 
ground criminal organizations and the creation of social problems within Iranian society 
as a whole.  In addition, a weak or failed Afghan government can add to the expansion of 
“violent crimes associated with drug-trafficking, such as small arms trafficking, armed 
robbery, and banditry” along the Afghan-Iranian border.245  Iran desperately needs a 
stable and functioning Afghan government in order to decrease the threat that is posed by 
the international drug cartels. 
In addition, a failed Afghan state would mean a prolonged American military 
presence within Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.  With a large American footprint 
already on their western border, this reality causes the Iranian government to feel 
encircled and threatened by its perceived number one enemy, the United States.  “One 
fear for Iran is that Afghanistan will turn into an enemy state and/or become a permanent 
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base for Iran’s enemies.”246  For these reasons, Iran, like China, would wish for 
Afghanistan to become successful as a nation-state and which in turn would expedite the 
departure of the United States and Coalitions Forces from the region. In summary, a 
failed Afghan government and state would mean an explosion in the drug trade, the 
continuation of the spread of instability into Iran, the increase of American military 
presence in region and the potential “export” of Afghan instability to the Central Asia, a 
region of great economic and political importance to the Iranians.247   
4. Pakistan 
Like Iran, Pakistan shares a long historical and strong ethnic bond with 
Afghanistan.  More than any other state in the region, the stability and success of 
Afghanistan is extremely crucial to Pakistan and its national security.  These tight bonds 
create the conditions, unlike any other state in the region, where Afghanistan’s success 
has a direct impact on Pakistan on many different social and political levels.248  First and 
foremost, Pakistan’s northern frontier states are inhabited by Pashtuns tribes and clans 
that share a strong ethnic bond with their Afghan relatives; in some case tribes literally 
live on both sides of the border of both states and don’t recognize either state’s legitimate 
rule over them.  If Afghanistan fails as a state or is drawn into open civil war, this could 
have a far reaching negative effect within Pakistan’s borders.  As goes the fate of 
Afghanistan’s Pashtuns, so does that of Pakistan’s Pashtuns.  
Economically, a sound and stable Afghanistan would be very beneficial to 
Pakistan as it tries to increase its trade with Central Asia and turn itself into a conduit of 
natural resources, flowing from the region to the remainder of the globe.  A strong 
Afghan government could “enable Pakistan to secure access to the Central Asian 
Republics with which they have no common border.” 249  Peimani further writes that 
“any amount of Central Asian trade conducted via the Pakistani route would be a 
welcoming economic activity for the Pakistanis because it would provide income in 
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transit fees and generate long term employment.”250  The failed attempts, under the 
Taliban rule, to secure passage for a pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan that would 
transport valuable natural resources, has not been forgotten by the Pakistanis who wish, 
more than anything, to have an Afghan government that is able to negotiate such deals 
and provide security for any future pipeline that might be built.  
Unlike China and Iran, however, Pakistan would stand to gain in having a weaker 
Afghan government in power in the long term because such a government would become 
more dependent on Pakistan.  In addition, a weaker Afghan government would not be 
seen as a threat to encouraging Pakistani Pashtuns to seek more autonomy or outright 
secession; however, on the other hand, a situation of civil war or ethnic fighting could 
give birth to the idea of the creation of a greater Pashtunistan that would also encompass 
Pakistan’s northern frontier territories.  For these reasons, Pakistan gains to win and lose 
if either Afghanistan is able to forge a strong central or if Afghanistan is only able to 
create a weak federated government under which no single central entity is able to hold 
the crucial reins of power.  For these reasons, Pakistan will continue to play a delicate 
balancing game in order to secure the best outcome for its own national security goals. 
5. India 
India, unlike Pakistan, lacks a common border with Afghanistan, as well as lacks 
any significant ethnic ties with that nation-state.  However, due to Pakistan’s role in 
Afghanistan and the region, India clearly has a strong interest in the outcome of the 
political process occurring in Afghanistan today.  India wishes for a strong independent 
Afghanistan that will rely less on Pakistani support and will not allow Pakistan to use 
Afghanistan as a source of economic and political strength.251  A weak or unstable 
Afghanistan would allow Pakistan to gain greater access to Afghanistan, as it did during 
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which India would like to avoid at all costs.  In addition, failure in Afghanistan can create 
numerous issues for India’s close friends, Russia and Iran, who would fair poorly due to a 
failed Afghan state.252 
India depends on Russia and Iran, both on the economic front as well as the 
political one, and any issue that might cause instability in these two states would have a 
direct impact on India, both on the economic and political realm.  A successful Afghan 
government means that both Iran and Russia will be able to use Afghanistan as a part of a 
transportation corridor for the flow of natural resources and products which would help 
decrease the instability of the region.  A strong and successful Afghan government will 
mean Pakistan will have less influence in the region and will also open up another 
regional actor for India to trade with and establish political ties.  So far, the current 
Afghan government has shown its willingness to have close relations with India and this 
trend, more than likely, would seem to continue if the current government is successful in 
the near future. 
6. Russia 
Like India, which does not share a common border with Afghanistan, Russia falls 
into that same category.  However, unlike India, Russia maintains strong ties within the 
region through the Central Asian Republics which allows Russia direct access to natural 
resources in the region.  For Russia, a failed Afghan state would mean the possible spread 
of this instability into Central Asia and the possibility that this instability would continue 
into Russia itself.253  Facing the daunting challenges in Chechnya and the Caucasus, the 
Russian government would welcome any indications of stability from Central Asia and 
try to prevent any situation that would allow the spread of such “chaos” to other parts of 
the region it sees as vital for its national security.   Historically, “as a by product of any 
prolonged period of instability and lawlessness in Afghanistan, Afghan based 
international drug-trafficking could also become a major source of concern for Russia, 
both for its expanding health hazards and also for its contribution to criminal 
activities.”254 
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A concern has been the growth of the drug trade in the region.  Of the current six 
routes that are used by the international drug-trafficking cartels to transport narcotics 
from this region, four pass directly through Central Asia and Russia as it goes onto 
Europe and the United States.255  Russia needs a strong Afghan government that would 
be able to stop the production of illegal narcotics and provide security along its borders in 
order to reduce the amount of drugs that are transiting the region.  A weak Afghan 
government could be detrimental for Russia and its interests in Central Asia.   
“Having lost mostly to the American camp just about all its Soviet era’s friends 
and allies, fear of a gradual process of encirclement by enemy or unreliable states close to 
its borders had made the Russian government concerned about the direction of political 
development in Afghanistan.”256  A strong and functioning Afghan government would 
mean the potential decrease in American military presence in the region and a chance for 
Russia to gain direct access to the government of Afghanistan.  Preventing the expansion 
of American political and military presence in Afghanistan and especially preventing its 
long-term stay there have become of “special importance to the Russians.”257   
7. United States  
Stability and the creation of a lasting democratic government in Afghanistan, for 
the United States, means the creation of a state that will no longer harbor or stand for 
terrorism and a friendly ally that will have access to Central Asia and the abundance of 
natural resources that are present in the region.  The United State would like to establish 
transportation corridors so that they can circumvent the territories of Russia and Iran 
when trying to bring the natural resources of Central Asia to the world markets.258  When 
looking at this from a geographic standpoint, “Washington has only two possible 
corridors to Central Asia that would be independent of America’s real and potential 
political competitors in the region, that being Russia, Iran and China.”259  This makes 
stability in Afghanistan very important for the United States.  A well established and 
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functioning Afghan government would be able to guarantee the security of a pipeline, as 
well as be in power for the foreseeable future, creating the atmosphere of trust that 
investment firms would be looking for, prior to investing in such large scale endeavors.  
The lessons learned by Unocal in the mid-1990s has not been forgotten by many in the oil 
and natural gas business.  
The United States also seeks to eliminate any terrorist groups based in and around 
Afghanistan as it continues to prosecute the Global War on Terror.  An Afghan 
government that is able to control its own territory and stop any attempt to open up the 
state as a safe haven for fundamentalist organizations could free up American fighting 
forces to continue the Global War on Terror in areas like Iraq and the Philippines.  
Afghanistan has the greatest chance of becoming the example of the successful 
implementation of such a policy.  
Close ties with Afghanistan also allows the United States to maintain a foothold 
in a region it historically has not had direct access to.  Afghanistan allows the United 
States to contain the nuclear powers in the region, mainly India, Pakistan, China, and 
possibly Iran, in the future.260  In addition, the Global War on Terror and the ability of 
American forces to be stationed in friendly Afghanistan has allowed the United States to 
contain Russia in the region and increase its influence over the Central Asian 
Republics.261  A successful Afghan government is imperative for the United States in 
order to maintain its presence in the region. 
A democratic Afghanistan can be an example for the Iranian people, as well as the 
people of Iraq, who are undergoing the same struggle in facing ethnic and religious 
differences in hopes of creating a democratic and all encompassing government.  A failed 
Afghan government that slips back into lawlessness would mean the United States would 
have to increase its presence in the region and double its efforts in trying to stop the 
creation of new and more dangerous anti-Western and anti-American terrorist 
organizations.  More than any other country involved in the region, the United States 
needs Afghanistan to succeed in its efforts to form a cohesive and strong central 
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government that would allow for the full participation of the Afghan people in the 
political process, as well as be able to maintain control over the war-torn state.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The failure of democracy can be brought about by “entrenched civilian or military 
elites, the absence of conducive social or cultural conditions, and inaptly designed 
institutions.”262  These key ingredients for failure for attempting democratic development 
exist today within Afghanistan.  As this newly formed government continues the difficult 
process of democratic growth it is facing the daunting challenge of overcoming ethnic, 
religious, economic and political differences that have plagued the state for over three 
decades of civil war and internal conflict.  Adding to the scenario of possible failure has 
been the simple fact that Afghanistan is being governed by members of the old military 
and political elite, as well as technocrats retuning to partake in government.  Most have 
not passed the legitimacy test in the eyes of ordinary Afghans which has called the entire 
process into question.  By forming a government that has sidelined key ethnic, religious 
and military leaders (mainly leaders from the anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban struggle) from 
within Afghan society, the Karzai government has left itself open for direct criticism.  
Compounding upon the problems just presented is the sheer fact that the Karzai 
government has been advocating for the creation of a strong presidential system for 
Afghanistan vice federated one.  A presidential system would mean that the majority of 
the state’s power would be concentrated within Kabul while sideling many of the local 
political structures within Afghan society already discussed.  The most important 
recommendation that this thesis could present is that for success in creating a stable and 
lasting government initially, Hamid Karzai and the current administration must share 
power with the periphery of Afghan society.  Only after stability and trust has been 
established, can the move towards creating a stronger central authority with popular 
support, combined with a national identity, can be achieved.  This path would create the 
most suitable conditions for the development of a democracy and help Afghans forge 
ahead into the future with brighter perspectives for their state. 
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In the historical context however, accomplishing these tasks have been difficult.  
Afghans, as a people, have had a great disdain for any central authority that has attempted 
to interject itself within their daily lives.  Roy writes that “one’s allegiance belonged to 
the restricted group and tribal code, not to the community (ethnic) or the state.”263  As 
previously discussed, Afghanistan is a nation made up of tribes and clans with strong ties 
to their individual local ethnic political units that allows little space for the central 
authority to enter and implement national level laws, rules, and regulations.  According to 
Roy, “western democracy is only meaningful under certain circumstances; these being 
the identification of civil society with the state and the evolution of a political entity 
which is something other than a political threat” to the population.264  Today in 
Afghanistan, due to the actions of the current government, central authority is seen as not 
only a threat, but also the reason for the prolonged existence of the social and economic 
problems facing the people and the nation. 
Rubin explains that “where the population is fragmented and not integrated into a 
single national society, the state cannot represent a common interest.”265  This has been 
true in Afghanistan.  The current government has been battling to overcome years of 
ethnic strain between rival groups while attempting to integrate members of different 
ethnicities into a central government.  This has been done in hopes that these individuals 
would function strictly as Afghans, promoting national cohesion rather than ethnic 
fragmentation.  However, “despite all centralization and nation building efforts of Afghan 
rulers (past and present), groups defining themselves as quams (ethnic group or tribe) are 
still the most essential constituents of the socio-political organization of Afghanistan,” 
writes Rasuly-Paleczek.266  Members of these quams bring with them notions of ethnic 
and tribal loyalty to seats of power, be they at the provincial or national level of 
government, which counters any effort in creating an all encompassing Afghan state. In 
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order for President Karzai to succeed, his government will need to foster the idea of 
Afghan nationalism over that of ethnic identity, which has existed in Afghanistan for 
centuries.  
Besides the impending difficulty of uniting ethnic factions under one government, 
the Karzai administration has seemed to have forgotten the harsh lesson learned by 
pervious Afghan rulers; lessons that revealed that the Afghan population requires piety of 
it rulers and that a religious establishment is seen as integral within government and 
within the daily lives of the Afghans.267  Historically, the single most uniting force for 
the Afghans has been Islam and its power to bring together many different ethnic groups 
and social networks when facing a common external or internal enemy.268  Roy writes 
that “in a country like Afghanistan, where the concept of the nation has developed but 
recently, where state is seen as external to society and where people’s allegiances is 
directed primarily towards their local community, the only thing which all Afghans have 
in common is Islam.”269  For the purposed of the current government, religion must be 
used in order to gain popular support and legitimacy.  This concept, however, begs the 
question, what role does religion have in a pure democratic system that has, thus far, had 
little use for this concept?  A recommendation for the Afghan government would be to 
use religion to garner greater support and use it as a tool of unity.  In time, this unity can 
develop into a greater sense of belonging to Afghanistan among the different ethnic 
entities within the state.  This sense of belong can further lead to the creation of a central 
Afghan identity that would, as proposed in this thesis, lead to democratic development 
and a  
Another challenge facing the Afghan government has been the almost total 
destruction of the Afghan state infrastructure, in the financial sense, which has directly 
impacted the slow economic development that has occurred thus far.  According to 
Akimbekov, this simply means that “Afghanistan lacks virtually all the conditions needed 
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to become a full-fledged state.”270  Not only has Afghanistan paid for the economic 
problems it is facing, so has its neighbors, Europe and the United States.  Economic 
development is crucial in order to establish the basic framework for nationhood and state 
formation.  Many Afghans have turned to the cultivation of opium as a source of 
economic relief, which in turn, not only damages Afghanistan’s economy, but also 
threatens it’s internal security.  More effort must be placed in the development of 
Afghanistan’s economy, both by the current government and external powers, be they 
donor states or the United Nations.  Economic development would build a sense of 
accomplishment on the part of the Afghan government and demonstrate to the population 
it’s ability to provide the basic services and goods that are required for statehood.   
In urban areas, this economic challenge has also had a negative effect on the 
general population.  Three major reasons for this has been, initially: the lack of stability 
within Afghanistan to create the proper conditions for economic growth, the added fact 
that the state currently lacks adequate domestic sources of financing for development and 
reconstruction projects, and Afghanistan lacks adequate numbers of trained workforce, 
whether skilled or professional.271  With these added deficiencies, Peimani further argues 
that “the resulting evils such as poverty, malnutrition, and extensive unemployment 
contribute to the prolongation of the status qou, which is prone to instability in various 
forms, including civil war.”272   
Unfortunately, economic hardship, so far has meant for the Afghan, the return of 
the khan class and warlordism which has created patterns of patronage that binds 
individual loyalties to local leaders, rather than the central Afghan government.  A 
successful counter to this growing trend has been the commissioning of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout Afghanistan.  Where they have been 
established, PRTs have provided the basic services a local government would, with the 
addition of security throughout their region of operation.  More PRTs are needed and 
must be manned more and more by Afghans themselves rather than coalition forces.  This 
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would show Afghans the central governments ability to provide for them, not only in 
security terms, but also on economic terms.   
 “So long as there is neither an effective government nor a system to balance the 
interest of various national and political groups, the threat of a new deterioration in 
Afghanistan will continue to exist.”273  Akimbekov further writes in regards to the future 
of Afghanistan’s current government and its efforts of producing a functioning and stable 
system of governance as a path that “will be long and, unfortunately, holds little promise 
of rapid success.”274  With the challenges facing Afghanistan and its government, there 
has to be a strong catalyst that unites all Afghans under one banner, be it economic 
development or a simple shift within the overall mindset of society that will allow for all 
ethnic groups to view themselves strictly as Afghans.  History has shown that when 
modernization and Western notions of government are forced upon the Afghans, this 
process has backfired and resulted in the collapse of governments.  Unfortunately for 
President Karzai and the current Afghan government, time is of the essences.  Steps need 
to be taken today, in order to secure a stable future, for not only this government, but the 
state as a whole.  Afghans and their nation have a great opportunity to create a lasting 
peace that has so long eluded them, but at the same time, they must be willing to 
overcome long standing differences.  Unless the current government can foster these 
ideas, unfortunately, the prospects for the development of a lasting and stable democracy, 
let alone a central government, will continue to be a fantasy for Afghans and 
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